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Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of
Incompatibility
by Barbara L. Atwell*

So the woman who has the baby is the surrogate mother. She is the
substitute. But for what? For the real mother? No, she is the real
mother. So, for what is she a surrogate? She is the surrogate, according
to logic (if that is not too strong a word to use in relation to what
lies behind this Bill or Act) for somebody who cannot have a baby.
But that does not make her a surrogate mother, it makes her a mother.
The woman who gets the baby is the substitute for that original mother
who hands the baby over by a process of adoption.'

INTRODUCTION
Since the highly publicized case of Baby M , 2 surrogate parenting
agreements have become a popular issue for public comment.
While the events leading to the Baby M case began in 1985, there
has been a resurgence of surrogate parenting3 since the
*
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1. 173 PARL.DEB., H . L . (5th ser.) 174 (1986), quoted in Means, Surrogacy
u. The Thirteenth Amendment, I V N . Y . L . SCH. H U M .RTS. A N N .445, 445 n. 1 (1987).
2. In re Baby M , 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
3. T h e woman who agrees to bear a child in a surrogate parenting arrangement is normally referred to as the "surrogate mother." As indicated above,
this term is misleading. In fact, the surrogate is not a surrogate mother at all,
but is the natural or biological mother of the child. It is perhaps more appropriate
to describe the surrogate as a "surrogate wife" since she substitutes for the wife
by bearing a child for the biological father. See Means, supra note 1, at 445 n.1.
See also THENEW YORKSTATETASKFORCEO N LIFE A N D T H E LAW, SURROGATE
PARENTING:
ANALYSIS
A N D RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PUBLIC
POLICY1 (1988) [hereinafter TASK
FORCEREPORT]("'[S]urrogate mother' is a misnomer because the
woman is actually a 'surrogate wife' for the purposes of procreation.").
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~ "surrogate parenting agreement" is an agreement in
which a surrogate agrees for a fee to be impregnated through artificial
insemination, to carry the child to term, and, after birth, to deliver
the newborn baby to the biological father and to surrender all the
parental rights she would otherwise have.5 It is then contemplated that
the wife of the biological father will adopt the child.6 Legal scholars7

4. T h e practice of surrogate parenting dates back to Biblical times. See
Genesis 16:2 ("Sarai said unto [her husband] Abraham, Behold, now, the L O R D
hath restrained me from bearing: I pray thee, go in unto my maid; it may be
that I may obtain children by her."); Genesis 30:3 (When Rachel was unable to
bear children for Jacob she told Jacob to "go in unto . . . [Bilhah] and she shall
bear upon my knees, that I may also have children by her. "). See also Katz,
Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling L a w s , 20 COLUM.J . L . & Soc. PROBS. 1
(1986).
5. See Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J . FAM. L.
263 (1982). Typically, the parties to a surrogate parenting agreement are the
surrogate, the biological father, and (where appropriate) the surrogate's husband.
In an effort to circumvent baby-selling statutes, the wife of the biological father
is generally not a party to the contract. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Ky. 1986). T h e biological
father and his wife will generally be referred to herein as the adopting couple.
Under this form of surrogate parenting agreement, the surrogate is both a
genetic" and "gestational" surrogate. She is a genetic surrogate because it is
her egg that is fertilized and she therefore has a genetic link to the child. She is
a gestational surrogate because she carries the child to term. There are other types
of surrogate arrangements. For example, the surrogate could be a gestational
surrogate only, that is a surrogate with no genetic relation to the child. This type
of surrogacy occurs when another woman's already fertilized egg is implanted into
the surrogate. This Article discusses women who are both genetic and gestational
surrogates.
In addition to surrogate parenting, there are several other relatively recent
advances in reproductive technology. For example, with artificial insemination by
donor (AID) a woman may become impregnated without intercourse. In fact, it
is through artificial insemination that a surrogate is impregnated. In the more
typical non-surrogate AID situation, though, a woman who has been impregnated
would keep the child upon birth. Another of the modern reproductive technologies
is in vitro fertilization (IVF). This form of reproduction involves fertilizing a
woman's egg in a laboratory and subsequently re-implanting the egg in her body.
Surrogate arrangements differ from AID and IVF in that they require the rental
of the woman's body over a prolonged period of time. See TASK
FORCEREPORT,
supra note 3 , at 82.
6. Katz, supra note 4, at 2; see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
7. See, e . g . , Lacey, T h e L a w of Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood
in Oklahoma: Roadblocks to the Right to Procreate, 22 TULSA
L.J. 281 (1987); Note,
' I
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and other professionals8 have debated the advantages and disadvantages, the legality or illegalityg of this form of procreation.

Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV.L. REV.
1936 (1986); Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. I L L . U . L.J. 147;
Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for N e w Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE
L.J. 187 (1986); Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis ofthe Problems and Suggestions
for Solutions, 50 T E N N .L . REV. 71 (1982); Note, An Incomplete Picture: The Debate
About Surrogate Motherhood, 8 HARV. WOMEN'SL.J. 231 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
An Incomplete Picture].
8 . See, e . g . , Parker, Surrogate Motherhood, Psychiatric Screening and Informed
L . 21
Consent, Baby Selling, and Public Policy, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
(1984) [hereinafter Parker, Surrogate Motherhood] (psychiatrist); Parker, Motivation of
117 (1983) [hereinafter
Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140: 1 AM.J. OF PSYCHIATRY
Parker, Motivation] (same).
9. There are many legal issues surrounding the validity of surrogate parenting. agreements. There are contract issues, for example, regarding both the
enforceability of the agreements and the appropriate remedy, if any, for their
breach. See, e . g . , Field, Surrogate Motherhood - The Legal Issues, IV N.Y.L. SCH.
H U M . RTS. A N N . 481 (1 987); Wolf, Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood Agreements: The
Trouble W i t h Specijic Performance, I V N.Y.L.. SCH. H U M . RTS. A N N . 375 (1987).
There is also the constitutional issue of one's privacy right of procreation. See Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See
also Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control ojConception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth,
69 VA. L . REV. 405 (1983). Some commentators have suggested that surrogate
parenting agreements must be enforced in order to avoid violating the parties'
constitutional privacy right of procreation. Coleman, supra note 7; Black, Legal
Problems ofSurrogak Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG.L. REV.373 (1981). A better approach
is to recognize that while there is a privacy right of procreation, the refusal to
enforce a surrogate parenting agreement does not impair that right. See Doe v.
Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U . S . 1183
(1983). If surrogate parenting agreements are not enforced, only one method of
procreation is prohibited - not procreation generally.
Another legal issue that arises in the context of surrogate parenting agreements is the presumption of paternity that the law imposes on the spouse of a
woman who has been artificially inseminated with her spouse's consent. See, e . g . ,
COLO.REV.STAT. § 19-4-106 (Supp. 1987) ("If, under the supervision of a licensed
physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially
with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as
if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived."). Obviously, in a
surrogate parenting arrangement, paternity is intended to rest with the biological
father rather than with the spouse of the surrogate. In an effort to circumvent a
similar provision in Michigan, the spouse of the surrogate signed a statement of
nonconsent" to the insemination of his wife. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich.
App. 506, 506, 333 IJ.W.2d 90, 92 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 420 Mich. 367,
-

'6
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This Article adds to the ongoing debate and suggests that, as
currently practiced, surrogate parenting is an attempt to create a
new form of independent adoption and that such agreements should
not be enforced to the extent that they are incompatible with legitimate and well thought-out public policies expressed in state adoption
statutes. Adoption is the method by which the state attempts to
provide a suitable home for children whose biological parents are
unable or unwilling to care for them.I0 Because it results in a permanent severing of the legal ties between a child and his or her
biological parents, adoption is strictly regulated by each state."
I n an effort to ensure that the interests of all parties - the
child, the biological parents, and the adoptive parents - are protected, several policies are reflected in state adoption statutes. One
such policy is to ensure that the consent of the biological parents to
surrender the child for adoption is voluntary and informed. l 2 Another
is to prevent children from being treated as chattel. Thus, states
prohibit ' 'baby-selling' ' or "baby-brokering' ' - a practice that tends
to subordinate the suitability of the home to the financial interest
of the baby-broker.13 Finally, states seek to protect the child by
ensuring that the adoptive parents are fit before they are granted
an adoption decree.I4 Since surrogate parenting agreements are a
form of adoption, they must conform to these policies.
This Article explores the public policy doctrine relating to contracts generally and examines specific public policies set forth in
state adoption statutes. The Article concludes that surrogate parenting agreements are 1) incompatible with consent provisions of
state adoption statutes, 2) inconsistent with state laws prohibiting
baby-selling, and 3) inconsistent with state adoption provisions that
provide for a thorough investigation of the adoptive parents in order
to ensure that the adoption serves the child's best interests. Accordingly, this Article suggests that as state legislatures debate the

362 N . W . 2 d 211 (1985). In Baby M, the surrogate's husband also refused to consent
to the insemination. See Surrogate Parenting Agreement between Mary Beth Whitehead, Richard Whitehead, and William Stern (Feb. 6 , 1985), Exhibit G [hereinafter
MBW Contract]. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
1 1 . See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 73-108 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 109-1 19 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
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best means of addressing the issue of surrogate parenting,I5 they
should recognize that surrogate parenting agreements must be restructured to avoid violation of adoption statutes. Surrogate parenting
agreements that comply with adoption requirements in all respects
except for failure to comply with adoption consent provisions should
be voidable. Surrogate parenting agreements that violate baby-selling
prohibitions or provisions requiring a n investigation of the adoptive
parents, however, should be void.
Part I of this Article examines the public policy doctrine as it
applies to traditional contract law. Part I1 explores the adoption
process and the public policies underlying it. Part I11 examines the
incompatibilities between surrogate parenting agreements and the
adoption statutes. Part 1V describes the modifications required in
the surrogate process in order to make surrogate parenting agreements enforceable and concludes by looking at surrogacy in the
context of society at large.

Traditional contract lawI6 permits private parties to contract
freely without undue government interference.I7 In fact, private contractual agreements are encouraged and considered an important
part of our free enterprise system.'* Individuals would be hesitant
to rely on each others' promises without the assurance that those
promises would generally be enforced. Without enforcement of promises, it would be almost impossible to conduct private business in
an orderly fashion. Accordingly, society has an interest in protecting

15. Many states have recently proposed bills on the issue of surrogate
parenting. Michigan is the first state that has actually enacted legislation. See injra
notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
16. "A contract is a promise o r a set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS
5 1 (1979).
17. E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS
§ 5.1 (1982) ("The principle of freedom
of contract rests on the premise that it is in the public interest to accord individuals
broad powers to order their affairs through legally enforceable agreements.").
18. See, e . g . , Wallihan v . Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 117, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558
(1954) ("The law looks with favor upon the making of contracts between competent
parties upon valid consideration and for lawful purposes."); Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV.L . R E V .741, 744 (1982) (''A modern free enterprise
system depends heavily on exchanges over time and on private planning.").
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the expectations of contracting parties by binding them to the contracts they make.lg In a n effort to further this societal interest, courts
normally enforce the promises of competent partiesz0 that are supported by c o n ~ i d e r a t i o n . ~ '
Not all promises, however, are e n f o r ~ e a b l e .For
~ ~ example, a
promise may be unenforceable due to the absence of consideration2"
or a failure to comply with the statute of frauds.z4 An agreement
that appears valid on its face may be unenforceable if duress,z5undue

19. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM.L. R E V . 629, 629-30 (1943).
[The freedom to contract] became the indispensable instrument of the
enterpriser, enabling him to go about his affairs in a rational way.
Rational behavior within the context . o f o u r culture is only possible if
agreements will be respected. It requires that reasonable expectations
created by promises receive the protection of the law. . . . [Flreedom
of contract does not commend itself for moral reasons only; it is also
an eminently practical principle. It is the inevitable counterpart of a
free enterprise system.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 M I N N .L. REV. 163, 165 (1985).
20. If one of the parties lacks capacity due to infancy or mental illness, the
(SECOND)
contract will be voidable by the party who lacks capacity. See RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS
$ 5 12-16 (1979). See also First State Bank of Sinai v . Hyland, 399
N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1987); Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196,
250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969); Keser v. Chagnon, 159 Colo. 209,
410 P.2d 637 (1966).
21. E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at
5.1.
22. Farnsworth, T h e Past of Promise: A n Historical Introduction to Contract, 69
COLUM.L . R E V . 576, 591 (1969) ("No legal system devised by man has ever been
reckless enough to make all promises enforceable."); Cohen, The Basis of Contract,
46 HARV.L. REV. 553, 573 (1933) ("It is indeed very doubtful whether there are
many who would prefer to live in an entirely rigid world in which one would be
obliged to keep all one's promises instead of the present more viable system, in
which a vaguely fair proportion is sufficient."); Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling C o . ,
369 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1962) ("We recognize that 'freedom of contract' is a
qualified and not an absolute right.").
23. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 237 K a n . 47, 697 P.2d 858 (1985); Sanders
v. Arkansas-Missouri Power C o . , 267 Ark. 1009, 593 S.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1980);
Zamore v. Whitter, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978); Kirksey v . Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131
(1845). See also A. CORBIN,CORBINO N CONTRACTS
167 (1963).
24. RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS
$ 5 110-50 (1979). See also Farmer's
(SECOND)
State Bank v. Conrardy, 215 Kan. 334, 524 P.2d 690 (1974); Harry Rubin &
Sons v. Consolidated Pipe C o . , 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
25. RESTATEMENT
O F CONTRACTS
55 174-76 (1979). See also Standard
(SECOND)
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i n f l ~ e n c e , 'or
~ mistakez7 induced one party to enter into i t . A court )
may deem unenforceable a contract that is procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.28 A court may also excuse performance under a
contract if there is a subsequent unforeseen event amounting to
impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose.29 Finally,
and most importantly for purposes of this discussion, a court may
refuse to assist in the enforcement of a contract if it concludes that
the contract violates public
T h e proposition that a contract may be void as against public
policy is easily articulated. T h e definition of public policy, however,
is much more e l u ~ i v e . ~In' the past, contracts that violated public
policy were referred to as "illegal" bargains.32 T h e current term,
"public policy," is broader because contracts may violate public
policy although they are not
"Public policy" encompasses
those principles designed to protect the welfare of the people.34T h u s ,
when a party challenges the validity of a n agreement based on public
policy, the underlying question faced by the court is whether the

Finance C o . v. Ellis, 3 Haw. App. 614, 657 P.2d 1056 (1983); Marriage of
Hitchcock, 265 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1978); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral C o r p . ,
29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971).
(SECOND)
O F CONTRACTS
$ 177 (1979). See also Dobbins
26. RESTATEMENT
v . Hupp, 562 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Agner v . Bourn, 281 Minn. 385,
161 N.W.2d 813 (1968).
27. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS
$ 5 151-58 (1979). See also Anderson Brothers Corp. v . O ' M e a r a , 306 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1962); Lenawee County
Rd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982); Sherwood v.
Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N . W . 919 (1887).
28. See Williams v . Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965). See also U . C . C . $ 2-302(1) (1964).
(SECOND)
O F CONTRACTS
$5 261-72 (1979).
29. RESTATEMENT
30. See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 448 (1874) ("[A] contract
may be illegal and void because i t is . . . inconsistent with sound policy and good
morals.").
31. See Henningsen v . Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403, 161 A.2d
69, 94 (1960) ("Public policy is a term not easily defined."). See also J . CALAMARI
& J . PERILLO,
CONTRACTS
$ 22-1 (3d ed. 1987) (public policy is "an amorphous
but ubiquitous concept").
(FIRST)O F CONTRACTS
$ 512 (1932).
32. See RESTATEMENT
33. See RESTATEMEST
(SECOND)
O F CONTRACTS
ch. 8 introductory note (1979).
3 4 . BLACK'SLAW D I C T I O N A R1041
Y (5th ed. 1979) (public policy refers to
"[tlhat principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good"). Public
policy may "for the good of the community" restrict the freedom to contract. Id.
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contract is consistent with the public interest.35 T h e perception of
what is or is not in the public interest, namely public policy, changes
with time.36
There are two basic reasons why a court will not enforce a
contract o r a portion thereof which offends public policy. First, by
refusing to enforce the contract, the court hopes to deter others from
making similar agreements. Second, the court does not want to assist
the promisee by permitting him or her to use the judicial system to
There is a greater
enforce a contract that violates public
reluctance to aid the promisee in these cases than there is a desire to
help the promisor.38

35. Anaconda Fed. Credit Union v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178, 483 P.2d
909, 91 1 (1971) ("[Tlhe courts can refuse to enforce any contract which they deem
to be contrary t o the best interests of citizens as a matter of public policy."). See
also Prince, supra note 19, at 170, who explains:
T h e phrasing of the public policy doctrine as applied to contracts has
been fairly consistent across time and jurisdictions. T h e Anglo-American
courts have stated repeatedly that they will not enforce contracts that
are contrary to public policy in that they injure the public welfare or
interests, o r are contrary to public decency, sound policy, and good
morals.
36. Wilson v. Carnley, 1 K.B. 729, 738 (1908) ("The determination of
what is contrary to the so-called 'policy of the law' . . . necessarily varies from
time to time. . . . T h e rule remains, but its application varies with the principles
which for the time being guide public opinion."); Weeks v. New York Life
Insurance C o . , 128 S.C. 223, 228, 122 S.E. 586, 587 (1924) ("Public policy [is]
a 'wide domain of shifting sands.' T h e term in itself imports something that is
uncertain a n d fluctuating, varying with the changing economic needs, social customs, and moral aspirations of a people.") (quoting MacKendree v. S . States Life
Ins. C o . , 112 S . C . 335, 335, 99 S.E. 806, 807 (1919)). See also A. CORBIN,supra
note 23, § 1375, at 12 ("It must ever be borne in mind that times change, and
that with them public policy must likewise change. A decision or a rule that is
believed to be in accord with the general welfare today may not accord with it
tomorrow. ").
(SECOND)
O F CONTRACTS
ch. 8 introductory note (1979).
37. RESTATEMENT
38. Id. In a breach of contract case, the plaintiff is generally the promisee the party who alleges that the defendantlpromisor failed to comply with the terms
of the contract. Assume a typical breach of contract case involving a contract for
the sale of cotton. If the buyer breaches the contract by failing to pay the contract
price, the court, in an action by the sellerlpromisee, will protect the seller's
expectation interest by requiring the buyer to compensate the seller for his loss.
This is in keeping with the societal interest in protecting the expectations of
contracting parties which in turn furthers our free enterprise system. In a contract
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Public policy is reflected in constitutions and statutes,39judicial
decision^,^^ and rulings of administrative a g e n ~ i e s . There
~'
has been
greater concern, however, over judicial pronouncements of public
policy than over public policy set forth by legislatures. There is an
apprehension that judicial pronouncements of public policy will simply reflect each judge's personal biases and opinions.42Therefore it
has been suggested that judicially created public policies would lead
to too much unpredictability - like an "unruly horse. "43 Moreover,

which violates public policy, though, the defendantlpromisor's promise may not
be enforced. This is not primarily to relieve the promisor of his contractual
responsibility since he agreed to the improper transaction, but to deny the promisee
the benefit of the bargain. E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at S 5.1.
39. "Constitutions and statutes are declarations of public policy by bodies
of men authorized to legislate." A. CORBIN,supra note 21, S 1375, at 15. See also
Pittsburgh, C . , C . & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 67, 115 N.E. 505,
507 (1916) ("It has frequently been said that . . . public policy is a composite of
constitutional provisions, statutes, and judicial decisions. "). See also Zamboni v.
Stamler, 847 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1988).
An example of a public policy created by the federal Constitution is the
Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits slavery. U.S. CONST.amend. X I I I . See
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
40. T h e public policy against the impairment of family relationships is a
judicial creation. E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at S 5.2. See Prince, supra note
19. For example, there is a public policy which favors the relationship of marriage.
E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 5 5.4. Thus, one court has condemned a
cohabitation agreement as being inconsistent with the institution of marriage.
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 111. 2d 49, 58-59, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (1979) (an agreement
for which consideration consists in whole o r in part of illicit sex is void). But see
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 113, 134 Cal. R p t r . 815,
831 (1976) (contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to extent
that consideration is explicitly illicit).
41. Zamboni, 847 F.2d at 82. See also Belenke v. S E C , 606 F.2d 193 (7th
Cir. 1979).
42. See Anaconda Fed. Credit Union v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178, 483
P.2d 909, 911 (1971) ("[Wlhether there is a prior expression or not the courts
can refuse to enforce any contract which they deem to be contrary to . . . public
policy."). Prince, supra note 19, at 172, explains:
When the courts are without relevant legislative direction . . . they must
focus on the specific policy standards accepted by society. Courts rely
on their subjective perceptions to determine these societal standards.
These perceptions will almost certainly vary depending on how judges
view their social environment, where the environment is located and
what the current societal morals are.
43. Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (Burrough, J.)
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if the opinions of each judge reflect his or her own personal view of
what the public interest is, that view may or may not accurately reflect
the public interest.
When public policy is declared by a constitution or legislative
enactment, the concern over unpredictability is reduced.44 First, it
is easier for the court to determine what the public policy is. T h e
judge is not basing the decision on his or her personal views, but
on the policy established by a duly elected legislative body. Second,
because the public policy is more defined, it is easier for a court to
determine whether a contract is compatible with the public p01icy.'~

("I, for one, protest as my Lord has done against arguing too strongly upon public
policy; - it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never
know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never
argued at all but when other points fail.").
44. Prince, supra note 19, at 171 ("[The] identification of public goals and
interest can be made with more certainty when legislative enactments exist. . . .
T h e basis for the statutory public policy rule is that a duly constituted, public
representative body has established law that reflects some public interest. T h e
courts are then bound to act in accordance with this statutory public policy.").
45. Legislative declarations of public policy have increased over the years.
Legislatures are often faster than courts in responding to matters of interest to
their constituencies and have greater resources than a court with which to respond
to a changing society. E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at S 5.5. If legislation
explicitly provides that contracts incompatible with it are unenforceable, a court's
function is relatively simple, and it will conclude that the contract should not be
enforced. But when the legislature enacts a statute, it often omits any reference
to the intended treatment of contracts which are incompatible with it. Then a
court must consider the violation of public policy on one hand, while on the other
weigh the policy favoring the enforcement of promises. Id. In Sirkin v. Fourteenth
St. Store, 124 A.D. 384, 108 N.Y.S. 830 (1908), for example, the buyer of goods
challenged the enforceability of a contract on public policy grounds although the
statute which set forth the public policy did not specify that contracts inconsistent
with it were unenforceable. In that case the plaintiff, a seller of hosiery, sued for
the purchase price of goods it delivered to buyer. T h e buyer defended on the
ground that the contract had been procured through commercial bribery in violation
of a New York statute and therefore was not enforceable. T h e seller had bribed
the buyer's purchasing agent in order to obtain the contract. T h e court noted that
while the statute did not specify how contracts procured through commercial bribery
should be treated, the statute did, nonetheless, indicate "the public policy of the
state." Id. at 389, 108 N.Y.S. at 833. T h u s , the court held the contract unenforceable in an effort to further the public policy and deter commercial bribery.
T h e dissent, however, argued that the express penalties imposed by the statute
should not have been supplemented by the court. I d . at 395, 108 N.Y.S. at 838
(Scott, J . , dissenting).
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When a court concludes that a contract violates public policy,
it need not declare the entire contract void; instead it may refuse
to enforce only a portion of the contract. It may also allow one
party to enforce the contract although the other party would not be
permitted to enforce it.46 T h e court thus retains some flexibility in
determining the degree to which the contract should be enforced.+'
Keeping in mind the general contract rules of public policy, a n
examination must be made of specific public policies that affect both
adoption and surrogate parenting agreements.

A.

The Adoption Process

Adoption did not exist at common law; it is entirely a creation
of the state and is governed by state statutes.48In general, the state
prefers to keep children with their biological parents.49Adoption is
the state's response to the needs of children whose parents are unable
or upwilling to care for them. It is the procedure by which the state
attempts to find a permanent home for those children who are without
one. In general, adoption permanently severs the legal ties between
a child and his or her biological parents.=O Since adoption is a state

46. As Professor Farnsworth explains:
[A] court will not necessarily condemn the entire agreement as unenforceable by both parties merely because it offends public policy. A
court may hold instead that the agreement can be enforced by one of
the parties though it cannot be enforced by the other. O r it may hold
that part of the agreement is enforceable, though another part of it is
not. It is therefore more accurate to say that the agreement or some
part of it is unenforceable by one or both parties than to say that it is
'void'.
E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 5 5.1.
47. In the surrogate parenting context, a court could declare that the agreement could be enforced by the biological mother but not by the biological father,
for example, in a case involving a birth defect where the biological father attempted
to renege on his promise.
48. In re Taggart's Estate, 190 Cal. 493, 213 P. 504 (1923).
49. B. JOE, PUBLIC
POLICIES
TOWARD
ADOPTION
11-12 (1979).
50. In some instances, the adopter is the stepparent o r some other relative
of the biological parent(s) - so that the child is able to maintain contact with
one o r both of the biological parents.
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creation that permanently removes children from their biological
parents, several states strictly construe their adoption statute^.^'
A couple that wants to adopt a child may generally follow one
of two procedures. T h e first and often preferred52 procedure is for
the couple to use an agency licensed by the state.53 T h e license
signifies that the state deems the agency to be an acceptable organization for child placement.54 When a couple interested in adopting
contacts a n agency, the agency will normally investigate the couple's
fitness as parents.55 A child will be placed with the couple should
the agency conclude that they are fit. The couple then petitions a
court to approve the adoption.
T h e second option open to couples in most states is the independent adoption, which is also known as private placement or gray
market adoption.56 No state-licensed agency is involved in a n independent adoption. Instead, the adoption is arranged by a private,
unlicensed intermediary such as a n .attorney, doctor, or member of

51. See, e.g., Scott v. Pulley 705 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Tenn. C t . App. 1985);
Anonymous v . Anonymous, 108 Misc. 2d 1098, 1102, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255, 255
(Sup. C t . 1981); Matter of Doe's Adoption, 89 N . M . 606, 555 P.2d 906 (Ct.
App. 1976). B u t see Wright v. M'ysowatcky, 147 Colo. 317, 363 P.2d 1046 (1961)
(adoption statutes should be liberally construed because of the humanitarian purpose
s shall
they serve). See also N.J. STAT.ANN. § 9:3-37 (West Supp. 1988) ( L L T h i act
be liberally construed to the end that the best interests of children be promoted.").
52. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., M I N N .STAT.A N N . 259.22 (West Supp. 1988) ("No petition
for adoption shall be filed unless the child sought to be adopted has been placed
by the commissioner of human services, the commissioner's agent, o r a licensed
child-placing agency. ").
54. See, e.g., IDAHOCODE 16-1602 (1979) ("'Authorized agency' means
the department of health and welfare or a local agency, or a person, organization,
corporation, benevolent society o r association licensed or approved by the department o r the court to receive children for control, care, maintenance or placement."). See also A R K . STAT.A N N .§ 9-9-202 (1977); M I N N .STAT.ANN. § 259.21
(West Supp. 1988).
55. See Note, Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear
in the Controversy Over Gray-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L . REV. 629, 633 (1980).
56. See, e.g., K Y . R E V . STAT.A N N . 199.473 (Baldwin 1984) (persons other
than licensed child-placing agencies may seek permission to place a child for
adoption); N.Y. DOMESTIC
RELATIONS
LAW 115-b (McKinney 1986). See also
Note, Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48, 54 (1976) ("In contrast to the
sinister sound of the term, gray-market adoptions, consisting of nonagency placement with nonrelatives, are legal in most states.").
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the clergy.57These intermediaries are not necessarily in the business
of child placement, but may be asked to arrange an adoption as an
incident to their professions. Normally, the intermediary places the
child in the prospective adoptive home. T h e state subsequently investigates the fitness of the couple, and a hearing is held in which
the adoption is granted or denied.58 In addition to the fact that in
a n independent adoption the intermediary is not licensed by the
state, another major difference between a n agency and an independent adoption is that in an independent adoption the investigation
of the prospective adoptive parents often takes place subsequent to
the placement of the
With a n agency adoption, a determination of the prospective adoptive couple's fitness. as parents is
generally made prior to placing a child with them.'jO
Several commentators have criticized independent adoptions because more abuses tend to occur through independent adoptions than
through agency adoption^.^' For example, a child placed for adoption
through a n independent procedure is more likely to become a victim
of the black market.62 Moreover, some studies conclude that there

57. See Note, supra note 55, at 629-30:
When a person o r couple decides to adopt a child in the United States,
there are several vehicles through which a child can be obtained. T h e
most extensively used is the adoption agency, which can be either a public
agency - an a r m of the government - o r a private agency - a
nonprofit entity. Both types of agencies are heavily controlled through
various state laws, rules, and regulations. In contrast to placement
through controlled agencies is placement through unlicensed groups and
individuals. This unlicensed placement activity [is] known alternately
as the gray market, private placement, or independent adoption.
58. Id. at 633.
59. Note, supra note 56, at 52-53 (1976) ("In an independent adoption,
there is seldom any requirement that adoptive parents be evaluated before
placement. ").
60. Note, supra note 55, at 633-34 ("When an agency places the child,
the . . . significant change in the sequence of events is that the agency will
investigate the prospective parents before they can receive a child." There is an
"absence of this preplacement evaluation of the adoptive parents and their home"
with an independent adoption.). Because of this difference in the sequence of
events, the child's best interests are arguably not sufficiently considered in the
independent adoption. Id.
6 1 . See, e.g. , Podol ski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption
Placement, 9 F A M . L.Q. 547 (1975); L. MCTACGART,
THE BABYBROKERS:THE
MARKETING
O F W H I T EBABIESI N AMERICA
(1980).
62. A black market adoption differs from a legal private placement or gray
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is a greater risk that the biological parents will not receive proper
counseling regarding the decision to place the child for adoption.63
There also appears to be a greater risk that the placement will not
be permanent due to some intervening problem.'j4 Because of the
potential problems associated with independent adoption^,^^ at least
one state prohibits independent adoptions completely, and many others severely restrict thern.'j6 O n the other hand, some commentators

market adoption only in that the intermediary receives a disallowable fee. Since
it is so easy to cross the line between a permitted private placement and an illegal
black market sale of a child, the threat of a black market adoption is greater with
independent adoptions. See Note, supra note 56, at 54.
63. NATIONAL
COMMITTEE
FOR ADOPTION,
ADOPTION
FACTBOOK
47-48 (1985)
[hereinafter ADOPTION
FACTBOOK].
Of the risks associated with independent adoptions, the National Committee for Adoption concludes that perhaps "most important
of all, [is the risk that] the biological parents [will] . . . receive little if any adequate
counseling regarding the plan that is best for them and for the child." Id. at 48.
64. For example, the adopting couple may specify that they want a healthy
child and may discover, after placement, that the child is not healthy. As a result,
they may attempt to return the child to the biological parents. See id. at 12.
65. See Amatruda & Baldwin, Current Adoption Practices, 38 J . OF PEDIATRICS
208, 209-11 (1951); H. WITMER,E. HERZOG,E. WEINSTEIN
& M. SULLIVAN,
INDEPENDENT
ADOPTIONS
337-62 (1963).
66. Massachusetts prohibits independent adoptions completely. MASS.G E N .
LAWSANN. ch. 210,
11A (West Supp. 1986) (No person other than a "duly
authorized agent or employee of the department of social services or a child care
or [licensed] placement agency" shall "in any way offer . . . to place, locate or
dispose of children for adoption.").
Some states prohibit independent placement unless the placement is by the
biological parents. See, e . g . , CAL. CIV. CODE 224p (West Supp. 1988) ("Any
person other than a parent who, or any organization, association, or corporation
that, without holding a valid and unrevoked license or permit to place children
for adoption issued by the State Department of Social Services, places any child
for adoption is guilty of a misdemeanor."). See also COLO.REV. STAT.§ 19-5-206
(Supp. 1987); GA. CODEANN. 5 19-8-3 (1977); MONT.CODEANN. § 40-8-108
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. 43-701 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. 127.240 (1979); R . I .
GEN. LAWS 15-7-1 (1970).
Another group of states generally prohibits independent adoptions, but provides for limited exceptions. See, e . g . , C O N N .G E N . STAT. A N N . § 45-69d (West
1987); D.C. CODE ANN. S 32-1005 (1988); IND. CODEANN. § 31-3-1-3 (Burns
1987); MD. FAM. LAW CODEANN. 5 5-507 (1984); MINN.STAT. ANN. 5 259.22
(West Supp. 1988); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-39 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-7-34 (1985). For a discussion of statd regulation of independent adoptions,
see Note, Independent Adoption: The Inadequacies of State L a w , 63 WASH.U . L . Q . 753,
755-56 (1985).

Heinonline - - 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.

14 1988-1989

19881

SURROGACY AND ADOPTION

15

argue that despite the foregoing risks, independent adoptions pose
no greater threat to a child's welfare than agency adoptions.67 There
are certain requirements, such as the investigation of the adoptive
parents, that state laws impose before the adoption takes place irrespective of whether that adoption takes place through an agency or
through private placement.

B.

Surrogate Parenting as a Form of Adoption

A surrogate parenting agreement is not in itself an adoption
agreement. It is an agreement pursuant to which the biological
mother agrees for a fee to terminate her parental rights upon the
birth of the child and to surrender the child to the biological father.68
A threshold question may be why surrogate parenting agreements
must conform to existing adoption statutes. The parties to the surrogate parenting agreement contemplate that the biological father's
wife, the stepmother, will adopt the
Surrogate parenting
agreements are, in effect, a form of independent adoption.70Their
ultimate goal is to make the contracting couple the legal parents of
the child through a d ~ p t i o n . ~Since
'
surrogate parenting agreements

67. See Note, supra note 55, at 629. See also W. MEEZAN,S. KATZ & E.
Russo, ADOPTIONS
WITHOUT
AGENCIES:
A STUDYOF INDEPENDENT
ADOPTIONS
23233 (1978).
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
69. "In the typical case, the surrogate . . . conceives, carries the child for
nine months, gives birth, and . . . releases her parental rights, giving u p the child
to the [contracting] couple for adoption." Katz, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added).
70. T h e trial court in Baby M, for example, upon declaring the surrogate
parenting agreement valid, immediately issued a decree of adoption to Elizabeth
Stern, the wife of the biological father. See 109 N.J. 396, 417, 537 A.2d 1227,
1237 (1988). Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial court,
holding that the surrogate parenting agreement was not enforceable, it acknowledged that the agreement was a form of adoption. "It strains credulity to claim
that these arrangements, touted by those in the surrogacy business as an attractive
alternative to the usual route leading to a n adoption, really amount to something
other than a private placement adoption for money." I d . at 424-25, 537 A.2d at
1241. See also Field, supra note 9, at 510 ("Surrogacy arrangements are sufficiently
similar to other adoption arrangements that the same rule[s] should apply."). For
a description of independent adoptions, see infra notes 56-67 and accompanying
text.
7 1 . There are several reasons why the adopting couple may prefer to use
a surrogate arrangement rather than proceeding through a traditional adoption.
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are an attempt to create a new form of independent adoption, their
compatibility with state adoption laws is critical.72
C.

Public Policy Interests Protected by the Adoption Process

The public policy interests protected by the adoption process
are reflected in three aspects of state adoption laws, all of which
apply irrespective of whether the adoption takes place through an
agency or private placement: the requirement of consent, the prohibition of baby-selling, and the requirement of an investigation.
1.

The Requirement of Voluntary, Informed Consent

Every state requires that the biological parents consent to the
adoption of their child before the adoption will be approved.73There
are several reasons for requiring the consent of the biological parents.

First, the surrogate arrangement maintains a genetic link, through the biological
father, between the adopting couple and the child. Second, the combination of the
increased use of contraception, the higher incidence of abortion, and the reduced
stigma attached to being a single mother has reduced the number of adoptable
white babies. T h u s the waiting period for the adoption of a white baby may be
as long as ten years. ADOPTION
FACTBOOK,
n p r a note 63, at 52. Surrogate parenting
presumably involves a much shorter waiting period than a traditional adoption.
Of course, there are children of many ethnic and racial minorities as well as foreign
and handicapped children who are available for and are waiting to be adopted.
For couples that are more flexible, a child can be adopted in a relatively short
period of time. See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
72. See TASKFORCEREPORT,supra note 3, at A-3, where the Task Force,
in concluding that surrogate parenting agreements should be declared void as
against public policy, included a legislative proposal "to reflect or incorporate
existing laws relating to adoption."
73. See W . MEEZAN,S. KATZ& E. RUSSO,supra note 67, at 149-50 (there
are certain limited circumstances in which consent is not required, e.g. when the
child has been abandoned, neglected, or abused). T h e authors write:
Before a child may be adopted the consent of the biological parents is
required in all instances unless they have voluntarily relinquished their
child, or the courts have terminated the parents' rights in the child due
to abuse or neglect, or have determined that waiver of the consent
requirement would be in the best interests of the child.
Id. See also Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N . M . 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957).
Consent of the biological parents may also be waived or supplemented with
the consent of the child if the child has reached a certain age. M o . ANN. STAT.
4 453.030 (Vernon 1986) (14 years old); PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 1, 4 2 (Purdon 1963)
(12 years old); R . I . G E N . LAWS4 15-7-5 (1981) (14 years old).
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One reason is the state interest in preserving the relationship between
the child and his or her biological parents. It is generally considered
preferable that parents and their biological offspring remain together.74A second, related reason for requiring consent is that the
involuntary termination of the biological parents' rights can only
occur under limited circumstance^.^^ The adoption process is designed
primarily as a mechanism for the voluntary termination of parental
rights.76A third reason for requiring the biological parents' consent
to the adoption is to protect the adoptive parents from being subjected
to the instability that would occur if the biological parents could
freely change their minds and reclaim their
Finally, consent
is required to prevent abuses which might otherwise occur if consent
were not required.78Thus, without consent of the biological parents,

74. See B. JOE, supra note 49, at 11.
75. The involuntary termination of parental rights can normally occur when
the parent has abandoned, neglected, o r abused the child. See, e . g . , IND. CODE
Ann. S 31-3-1-6 (Bums 1987); OR. REV. STAT. S 109.324 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS
S 15-7-7 (1981). When parental rights are involuntarily terminated, the child often
becomes available for adoption.
76. While parents are permitted to voluntarily terminate their parental rights
via the state adoption process, they may not contractually agree to terminate one
parent's parental rights independent of the adoption process. In Hawkins v. Frye,
1988 W L 59841 (Fam. C t . Del. May 25, 1988) (West), a divorcing couple contractually agreed to terminate the father's parental rights. I n refusing to enforce
this provision of the contract, the court in Frye relied on the reasoning in Baby
M:
[I]t is clear that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental
rights, or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced in
our courts. The Legislature would not have so carefully, so consistently,
and so substantially restricted termination of parental rights if it had
intended to allow termination to be achieved by one short sentence in
a contract.
109 N.J. 429, 537 A.2d at 1234-44.
77. See W . MEEZAN,
S . KATZ& E. RUSSO,supra note 67, at 150 ("[Clonsent
affords protection to the prospective adoptive parents as a legal guarantee of the
child's availability."). Some states, however, permit the biological parents to
withdraw consent more easily than others. Id. Therefore, the giving of consent is
not a total guarantee of protection for the prospective adoptive parents.
78. See Banvin v. Reidy, 63 N . M . 183, 191, 307 P.2d 175, 180 (1957). For
example, kidnapping a child in order to place him or her for adoption would pose
a greater threat if the adoption could legally occur without the consent of the
biological parents. T h e consent requirement makes it more difficult for this kind
of abuse to occur.
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no state permits a child to be taken from them unless the child has
been abandoned, neglected, or abused.79
The consent that is required of the biological parent is generally
referred to as intelligent, voluntary consent, or consent that is made
on an informed basis.80 The consent of the biological parents must
therefore satisfy two criteria: it must be informed and it must be
voluntary. T o ensure that consent to an adoption is informed, it
must generally be made in ~ r i t i n g , but
~ ' informed consent involves
more than the mere signing of a form.82 It is a process that involves
an exchange of i n f o r r n a t i ~ n .Informed
~~
consent requires that the
biological parents understand the implications of their decision to
surrender their child for adoption. They must be advised by counsel,
the court, or some other appointed person that adoption results in
a permanent severing of their legal relationship with the
If
they are not so advised, and are not made to understand the

79. See supra note 75. T h e surrogate, by signing the surrogate parenting
agreement and going forward with the pregnancy is arguably abandoning the child,
b u t the signing of a form prior to the child's birth cannot realistically be equated
to the abandonment of a living child. T h e better approach would be to recognize
that, until the child is born, it is incapable of being abandoned.
80. See, e . g . , FLA. STAT.A N N .5 63.092 (West 1985) (a study shall be made
to determine "whether the consent of the natural parent o r parents has been given
on an informed and voluntary basis"). See also Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315,
315, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971) (consent must be given "freely and voluntarily");
In re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949) (consent must be intelligent,
voluntary, and deliberate).
81. COLO. R E V . STAT. 5 19-5-203 (1986); G A . CODEA N N . 5 19-8-3 (1977);
HAW.REV. STAT. 5 578-2 (1985); M E . REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 5 532 (1979);
S.C. CODE A N N . 5 20-7-1710 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE A N N . 5 63.1-225
(1987); W . VA. CODE 5 48-4-3 (1986).
82. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
83. F. ROSOVSKY,
CONSENT
TO TREATMENT:
A PRACTICAL
GUIDE3 (1984)
("Consent is a process, not a form.").
84. See W . MEEZAN,
S. KATZ& E. RUSSO,supra note 67, at 150 (The purpose
of the consent is to ensure the court that the biological parent "understands the
implication of consenting to the adoption - that the parent-child relationship will
be completely and permanently severed."). Thus, in In re Cheryl E., 161 Cal.
App. 3d 587, 207 Cal. R p t r . 728 (1984), where a social worker informed the
biological mother that she could change her mind within one year of signing the
consent form, the adoption decree was set aside. See also Keheley v. Koonce, 85
G a . App. 893, 70 S.E.2d 522 (1952) (attorney advised biological mother that she
could reclaim her child within one year).

Heinonline - - 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.

18 1988-1989

19881

SURROCACY AND ADOPTION

19

consequences of their actions, the consent is invalid.85The biological
parents should also be advised of the psychological consequences of
their decision. They should be advised that the separation from the
child can, and undoubtedly will, be emotionally trying.86 Many states
attempt to ensure that the biological parents are aware of the emotional and psychological feelings which may confront them by prohibiting them from consenting to the adoption prior to the child's
birth.87These states recognize that until the child is born, the consent
is necessarily uninformed. Until the child's birth, the parent is unable
to understand how he or she will feel with respect to giving the child
up for adoption.88
In order to be valid, the consent of the biological parents must
also be given voluntarily. Consent may be involuntary for a number

85. See, for example, In re the Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850, 857-58
(Okla. 1977), where the court explained:
T h e court should thoroughly advise the relinquishing parent of the nature
of his or her actions, and of the seriousness of the attendant consequences. As completely as possible, the court should attempt to ascertain
whether the natural parent has a n intelligent comprehension of their
[sic] action. . . . Attorneys representing adoptive parents and adoption
agencies, as well as attorneys representing relinquishing natural parents,
should insist that these measures be taken to fully protect their clients
and more importantly, to avoid subsequent emotionally traumatic custodial changes of the adopted child.
86. T h e doctrine of informed consent does not require that the patient be
informed of obvious risks. Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558 (D.C. 1982). It may
be argued that it will obviously be difficult emotionally for a biological parent to
separate from his o r her child. Every parent who decides to give a child u p for
adoption undoubtedly is aware that it may be extremely painful. In fact, though,
the emotional aspect is such an important matter for a parent to understand in
the course of making his or her decision that it should not go unaddressed. T h e
consideration of emotional repercussions is something which proper counselling
can likely facilitate. Therefore, counselling ought to be given.
87. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
88. See Keheley v. Koonce, 8 5 G a . App. 893, 900-01, 70 S.E.2d 522, 527
(1952), where the court, quoting the policy of the Fulton County Welfare Department, explained: "'We do not accept releases before birth; we d o not accept
them until sometime after the child is born because mothers d o change their minds
and we want to give them time in which to be sure they want to release the
child."'
See also Gaffney, Mate~nal-FetalAttachment in Relation to Self-Concept and A n x - 9 ,
15 MATERNAL-CHILD
NURSING
J . 91 (1986) (author discusses the bonding between
mother and child that occurs during pregnancy). See infra notes 137-142 and
accompanying text.
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of reasons. For example, consent given by the biological parents
based on duress is not considered v ~ l u n t a r y ;nor
~ ~ is it voluntary

89. Assuming that competent parties have entered into a contract, courts
generally attempt to enforce their expectations. See discussion supra note 18. If,
however, there is improper conduct on the part of one of the parties during the
bargaining process amounting to duress, a court may allow the other party to
avoid the transaction. E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 5 5 4.9, 4.16. While every
bargain generally involves some degree of coercion, duress refers to coercion to
such a degree that the assent given has not been given freely. I d . at 5 4.9. Duress
is an improper threat which induces the other party's assent by leaving "no reasonable
alternative." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS
5 175(1) (1979).
Normally, the threat of withholding a financial incentive is not considered
sufficient in itself to constitute duress. In fact, duress was once limited to threats
of physical harm and was only later expanded to include threats involving economic
duress. E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 5 4.17. See also Dawson, Economic Duress An Essay in Perspectiue, 45 MICH. L . REV. 253, 255 (1947). Recently, courts have
begun to expand the doctrine of duress. Thus, it is impossible to create a bright
line test for determining which threats constitute duress and which d o not. Some
commentators have suggested that the courts should focuson the unfairness of the
bargain rather than on the impropriety of the threat. I d . at 286. Moreover, the
surrounding circumstances should be considered, including the victim's "age and
background, the relationship of the parties, and the availability of disinterested
advice." E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 5 4.18.
Duress, in the adoption conttxt, is "defined . . . according to its generally
understood meaning, to signify that condition which exists where one is induced
by the unlawful act of another to make a contract or to perform or forego a n act
under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of his free will." Scott v.
Pulley, 705 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. C t . App. 1985). It is extremely difficult to
prove duress in adoption cases. There is a general recognition that parents will
not place a child for adoption if they are not faced with some unfortunate circumstance. This "duress of circumstance" is not generally sufficient to vitiate the
consent of the biological parents. As the court in Barwin v. Reidy explained:
If consents to adoption were ineffective every time this sort of duress
entered the picture, it is difficult to see how any adoption where consent
is required could be allowed to stand, for what natural parent would
ever consent to the adoption of his or her child in the absence of duress
of circumstance?
62 N . M . 183, 198, 307 P.2d 175, 185 (1957) (The court went on to find, however,
that impermissible payments to the biological parents vitiated consent.). Other
courts have also held that duress of circumstance is not sufficient to vitiate consent.
See Wooten v. Wallace, 351 S.E.2d 72, 74 ( W . Va. 1986) ("'Duress of circumstance'
has generally been held insufficient to void an otherwise valid consent to adopt. ");
In re Adoption of E . W . C . , 389 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (Surr. C t . 1976) ("No statute
has said that surrenders are valid only if executed free from emotion, tensions and
pressures caused by [trying circumstances].").
Findings of duress have generally been limited to cases where the biological
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when based on undue influence,g0 fraud,g' or mistake.92Consent is
also not considered voluntary when it is
Thus, states prohibit biological parents from receiving a fee in exchange for their
consent to place a child for adoption. T h e prohibition of such fees
along with the prohibition on pre-birth consent must be explored
further in order to understand how they facilitate the states' policy
of ensuring that consent is voluntary and informed.
a.

Consent Prior to Birth

Many adoption statutes expressly prohibit the biological parents
from consenting to an adoption prior to the child's birth.94 In other

parent consented while under the effects of medication o r under extreme pressure
from family members. See Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1984) (mother
was threatened with criminal abuse charges); Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850
(Okla. 1977) (stepmother threatened to kill biological mother and her father); In
re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949); Huebert v. Marshall, 132
Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d 464 (1971).
90. Undue influence is similar to the doctrine of duress but is a doctrine
which grew u p in equity "to give relief to victims of unfair transactions that were
supra note 17, at $ 4.9. "In
induced by improper persuasion." E. FARNSWORTH,
contrast to the common law notion of duress, the essence of which was simple fear
induced by threat, the equitable concept of undue influence was aimed at the
protection of those affected with a weakness, short of incapacity, against improper
persuasion, short of misrepresentation or duress, by those in a special position to
exercise such persuasion." Id. at $ 4.20. T w o elements are normally required to
make a case of undue influence: "a special relation between the parties" and
"improper persuasion of the weaker by the stronger." Id. at $ 4.19. See also
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)O F CONTRACTS
$ 177 (1979).
In adoption cases, undue influence and duress are often not clearly distinguished from one another, and the definition of undue influence has been described,
like duress, as force or coercion that deprives one of his o r her free will. See In
re Adoption of a Minor Child, 109 R . I . 443, 452, 287 A.2d 115, 119 (1972) ("A
finding of undue influence is warranted only when the evidence shows that the
influence has been exerted to such a degree as to amount to force or coercion so
that the actor's free agency is destroyed.").
91. In re the Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850, 857-58 (Okla. 1977) (The
court must "determine whether the action is taken voluntarily, without being
obtained by reason of fraud, duress, o r promise by another."). See also In re Steve
B.D.,'111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).
92. See, e . g . , In re Adoption of Anonymous, 60 Misc. 2d 854, 859, 304
N.Y.S.2d 46, 52 (1969) (lack of adequate counselling); In re D, 408 S.W.2d 361
(Mo. C t . App. 1966).
93. See infra notes 99-108 a n d accompanying text.
94. See, e . g . , ARIZ. REV. STAT. A N N . $ 8-107 (1983) ("A consent given
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states, where there is no express statutory prohibition against giving
consent to an adoption prior to birth, statutes have nevertheless been
. ~ ~ with such a prohibition
construed to imply such a p r ~ h i b i t i o nStates

before seventy-two hours after the birth of the child is invalid."); C O N N .G E N .
STAT. A N N . 5 45-61c(d) (West Supp. 1987) ("No consent to termination by a
mother shall be executed within forty-eight hours immediately after the birth of
her child."); FLA. STAT. A N N . 5 63.062 (West 1977) ("[A] petition to adopt a
minor may be granted only if written consent has been executed after the birth of
the minor" by the natural mother andlor father.) (emphasis supplied); FLA. STAT.
ANN. 5 63.082 (West 1978) ("The consent shall be executed only after the birth
of the child."); G A . CODEANN. 5 19-8-4 (Supp. 1987) ("A surrender . . . shall
be executed following the birth of the child."); ILL. R E V . STAT.ch. 40, para. 1511
(1973) ("A consent o r a surrender taken not less than 72 hours after the birth of
the child is irrevocable. . . . No consent or surrender shall be taken within the 72
hour period immediately following the birth of the child."); I N D . CODE A N N .
5 31-3-1-6 (Supp. 1987) ("The consent to adoption may be executed at any time
after the birth of the child."); IOWACODEA N N . 5 600A.4 (West 1977) (A release
of custody must be signed "not less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the
child."); KY. REV. STAT. A N N . 5 199.500 (MichieIBobbs-Merrill 1987) ("In no
case shall . . . consent for adoption be held valid if such consent . . . is given
prior to the fifth day after the birth of the child."); M D . F A M .LAW CODEA N N .
5 5-324 ("The court may not enter a final adoption decree until at least 15 days
after the birth of the individual to be adopted."); MISS. CODEA N N . 5 93-17-5
("[Clonsent shall be duly sworn to or acknowledged and executed . . . not before
three (3) days after the birth of [the] child."); NEV. R E V . STAT. 5 127.070 (1987)
("All releases for and consents to adoption executed by the mother before the birth
of a child are invalid."); N . H . REV. STAT. A N N .§ 170-B:7 (1973) ("No consent
or surrender shall be taken until a passage of a minimum of 72 hours after the
birth of the child."); N.D. CENT.CODE 5 14-15-07 (1981) ("The required consent . . . shall be executed at any time after the birth of the child."); O H I OREV.
C O D EA N N . 5 3107.08 (Baldwin 1977) ("The required consent to adoption may
be executed at any time after seventy-two hours after the birth of a minor.");
T E N N .CODEANN. § 36-1-1 14 (1986) ("In no event shall a surrender [of a child]
made prior to the birth of the child be effective."); W . V A . CCDE 5 48-4-5 (1985)
(Consent may be revoked if executed prior to "seventy-two hours after birth of
the child."). But see WASH. REV. CODE 5 26.33.090 (Supp. 1988) (consent may
be given prior to birth unless the child is an Indian).
95. In re Baby M , 109 N.J. 396, 422, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (1988) ("[Tlhe
natural mother's irrevocable agreement, prior to birth, even prior to conception,
to surrender the child to the adoptive couple . . . is totally unenforceable in private
placement adoption. Even where the adoption is through a n approved agency, the
formal agreement to surrender occurs only afier birth, a n d then, by regulation,
only after the birth mother has been offered counseling.") (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original); J . D . ex rel. J . D . v. L . D . P . , 713 P.2d 1191, 1193, aff'd,
719 P.2d 1370 (Wyo. 1986); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 108 Misc. 2d 1098, 1101-
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recognize that it is impossible for consent to be given on an informed,
intelligent basis prior to the child's birth. Accordingly, in these
jurisdictions, the parents may revoke consent given prior to the birth
of the child. Moreover, many states provide that even if the biological
parents give consent after the child's birth, that consent may be
revoked with relative ease within a short period of time.96
One reason to prohibit pre-birth consent is to protect the biological parents from making a hasty, ill-considered, and uninformed
decision about the adoption.97 Prohibitions are also based on the
recognition that pregnancy and childbirth can be a woman's most
personal and emotional experience. Bonding between mother and
child may take place during pregnancy and at birth. "Attachment
begins with the . . . sensations created by fetal movement which

02, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255, 260 (Queens Cty. 1981) ("In the opinion of this court,
any consent to adoption of an unborn child is not in conformance with statute. . . .
T h e court holds that for the purposes of this statute and for reasons of public
policy, a n unborn child was never intended to be included in the definition of a
person."); In re Adoption of R.A.B., 426 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. Dist. C t . App.
1983); Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1970); In re Adoption of
Kreuger, 104 Ariz. 26, 30, 448 P.2d 82, 86 (1969). See also ADOPTION
FACTBOOK,
supra note 63, at 76-85, where the only state listed as permitting pre-birth consent
is the State of Washington.
.
ANN.8 36-1-117 (Supp. 1988) ('LProvided a petition
96. See, e . g . , T E N NCODE
to adopt has not been filed, any parent(s) who has surrendered a child for adoption
shall have the absolute right to revoke the surrender within fifteen (15) days from
the date of the execution of the surrender . . . .").
See also ALASKA
STAT. § 25.23.070 (1983) ("A consent to adoption may be
withdrawn before the entry of a decree of adoption, within 10 days."). Cf. DEL.
CODEA N N .tit. 13, 8 909 (Supp. 1988); M D . FAM.LAWCODEA N N .8 5-311 (1984).
97. See, e . g . , M D . FAM. LAW CODEA N N . 8 303 (1984) ("The purpose of
this subtitle [is] to protect . . . the natural parents from a hurried or ill-considered
decision to give a child up."); N.H. REV. STAT. A N N . 170-B:l (1973) ("The
policies and procedures for adoption . . . [have] as their purpose . . . protection
of . . . [tlhe natural parent o r parents, from hurried and coerced decisions to give
u p the child."). See also Note, Surrogate Motherhood Legislation: A Sensible Starting
Point, 20 I N D . L . REV. 879, 888 (1987) ("The purpose of the law is to prevent
an expectant mother from making a hasty and later regretful decision to give up
her child for adoption."). T h u s the biological parents a r e permitted to choose,
after the birth of the child, whether to go forward with the adoption. See Surrogate
Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth ex ref. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213
(Ky. 1986) ("The policy of the . . . consent to adoption statute is to preserve to
the mother her right of choice regardless of decisions made before the birth of the
child.").
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validate the mother's awareness of another - an awareness that
continues throughout pregnancy. " 9 8 Thus, a woman who bonds with
the child during pregnancy or at birth is in a tragic situation if she
is forced to give her child u p for adoption based on consent given
prior to the birth of the child. State permission to give consent prior
to birth would leave the biological mother with no recourse but to
complete the adoption. States that prohibit biological parents from
granting consent to adopt prior to the child's birth explicitly and
implicitly recognize that bonding between a biological mother and
her child may occur, to varying extents, during the course of the
pregnancy as well as at birth. Thus, pre-birth consent is strongly
disfavored.
b.

Financial Incentive

States also seek to ensure voluntary consent by prohibiting payment of fees to the biological parents in order to induce their consent.99

98. See Gaffney, supra note 88, at 92. See also Hersh & Levin, How Love
READINGS
ON MOTHER-INFANT
BONDING
Begins Between Parent and Child, in SELECTED
29 (1979) ("[Olnce the child arrives the mother love that so strongly shapes the
infant's future unfolds in a complex and wonderful pattern. This mysterious process
begins before birth."); Kennell, Voos & Klaus, Parent-Infant Bonding, in id. at 62
("After [fetal movement] a woman will usually begin . . . developing a sense of
attachment and value toward [the infant]. ").
99. See, e . g . , ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1940) ("It shall be unlawful for any
[unlicensed] person . . . to . . . hold out inducements to parents to part with their
offspring."); ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. § 8-114 (Supp. 1987) ("[A] person shall not
be directly o r indirectly compensated for giving . . . consent to place a child for
adoption."); A R K . STAT. A N N . 5 9-9-206 (1977) ("Under no circumstances may
a parent or guardian of a minor receive a fee, compensation, o r any other thing
of value as a consideration for the relinquishment of a minor for adoption.");
CAL. PENALCODE § 273 (West 1967) ("It is a misdemeanor for any person . . .
to pay money or anything of value, to a parent for . . . the consent to an adoption.");
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115 (Supp. 1987) (''No person shall offer [or] give . . .
any money or other consideration o r thing of value in connection with the consent
to adoption."); DEL. CODEANN.tit. 13, § 928 (1953) ("No natural parent of any
child whose adoption is proposed shall receive any contribution, fee or emolument
of any sort from any person . . . having any connection . . . with the placement
of the child for adoption or with the adoption."); FLA. STAT.ANN. 5 63.212 (West
Supp. 1987) ("It is unlawful for any person . . . [hlaving the rights and duties
of a parent with respect to the care and custody of a minor to assign or transfer
such parental rights for the purpose of, incidental to, or otherwise connected with,
selling or offering to sell such rights and duties."); G A . CODE A N N . 5 19-8-19
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Most states, however, permit the adopting couple to reimburse the
biological parents for medical expenses incurred in connection with
the pregnancy and childbirth. loo Some states also permit the adopting
parents to pay the legal fees incurred by the biological parents, and
some go so far as to allow the biological parents to be reimbursed
for living expenses incurred during pregnancy.'O1 No state, however,

(Supp. 1984) ("It shall . . . be unlawful for any [unlicensed] person . . . to hold
out inducements to parents to part with their children."); IND.C R I M .CODE5 3546-1-9 (1980) ("[A] person who, with respect to a n adoption, transfers . . . any
property in connection with . . . the termination of parental rights, [or] the consent
to adoption . . . commits . . . a class D felony."); IOWACODEANN.5 600.9 (West
1977) ("A natural parent shall not receive any thing of value as a result of the
natural parent's child or former child being placed with and adopted by another
person."); M I C H . COMP. LAWSANN. 5 710.54 (West Supp. 1987) ("[a] person
shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value
in connection with . . . [a] consent [for adoption]"); S.C. CODEANN.5 20-7-1690
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) ("Under no circumstances may a parent. . . receive a
fee, compensation, or any other thing of value as consideration for consent o r
relinquishment for the purpose of adoption."); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWSA N N . 5 256-4.2 (1984) ("Any person who offers . . . any money or other consideration o r
thing of value . . . relating to the consent to adoption . . . is guilty of a . . .
felony."); TENN.
CODEANN.5 36-1-135 (1978) ("it is unlawful for any [unlicensed]
person . . . [hlaving the rights and duties of a parent with respect to the care and
custody of a minor to assign o r transfer such parental rights for the purpose of,
incidental to, or otherwise connected with, selling o r offering to sell such rights
and duties"); UTAH CODEANN. 5 76-7-203 (1973) (No payment may be made to
the biological mother "for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, o r legal
guardian to . . . consent to the adoption, or co-operate in the completion of the
adoption."); WIS. STAT.ANN. 5 946.716 (1981) (Any person who, "[iln order to
receive a child for adoption, gives anything exceeding the actual cost of the hospital
and medical expenses of the mother and the child incurred in connection with the
child's birth, and of the legal and other services rendered in connection with the
adoption" commits a Class E felony.).
100. See, e . g . , MD. FAM. LAW CODEANN. 5 5-327 (1984) ("This subsection
[barring baby-selling] does not prohibit the payment, by any interested person, of
reasonable and customary charges or fees for hospital o r medical o r legal services. ");
ARK. STAT.ANN. 5 9-9-206 (1977) (''[Ilncidental costs for prenatal, delivery, and
postnatal care may be assessed, including reasonable housing costs, food, clothing,
general maintenance, and medical expenses, if they are reimbursements for expenses
incurred or fees o r services rendered."). See also Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385,
392, 293 N.W.2d 90, 95 (1980).
101. See In re Baby Girl D, 512 Pa. 449, 451, 517 A.2d 925, 927 (1986)
("Traditionally, allowable expenses to adoptor parents have been limited to reasonable unreimbursed lying-in expenses, reasonable legal fees incident to the adoption
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permits a fee to be paid to the biological parents in exchange for
their agreement to surrender the child. The prohibition of such fees
is an acknowledgement that the financial incentive may induce a
biological parent to consent to an adoption of a child whom he or
she would otherwise keep. In Downs v. Wortman, for example, the
court held that an offer to pay the airfare for the biological mother
to go to Illinois where her parents lived vitiated her consent.'02 In
Downs, it was unclear whether the offer to pay the airfare was made
directly by the adoptive parents or through an intermediary. The
court recognized that regardless of the source, the mother's desire
to visit her parents may have overcome her ability to make a voluntary decision about the adoption and concluded that the contract
was void as against public policy.lo3 The court distinguished between
payments made for the benefit of the biological parent and payments
made for the benefit of the child. It concluded that while the latter
are permissible, the former violate public policy.Io4 I n Barwin v.
Reidy,'05 the court explained the reason for permitting payments which
benefit the child:
It is commonly the case that persons wishing to adopt a
child will make provision with its mother, or mother and

proceedings and costs of the proceeding."). See also Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M.
183, 193, 307 P.2d 175, 181-83 (1957); Adoption of Baby Girl Fleming, 471 Pa.
73, 80, 369 A.2d 1200, 1204 (1977); In re Stone's Adoption, 398 Pa. 190, 195,
156 A.2d 808, 811 (1959). It has been suggested that the payment by the adoptive
parents of the biological parent's legal fees is not advisable since it may affect the
attorney's ability to adequately represent the biological parents. See Petition of
Steve B.D., 11 1 Idaho 285, 289, 723 P.2d 829, 836 (1986).
102. Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 315, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971)
(The court explained, based on these facts, that "the consent to the adoption, at
least as to the natural mother, was not freely and voluntarily given."). See also
Scott v. Pulley, 705 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ("'Moral duress'
consists in imposition, oppression, undue influence, or the taking of undue advantage of the business or financial stress or extreme necessities or weakness of
another, and relief is granted in such cases on the basis that the p a r 9 benefitin!
thereby has received money, property, or other advantages. ") (emphasis supplied).
103. Downs, 228 Ga. at 315, 185 S.E.2d at 388. See also Gordon v. Cutler,
324 Pa. Super. 35, 471 A.2d 449 (1983); Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 293
N.W.2d 90 (1980).
104. Downs, 228 Ga. at 315, 185 S.E.2d at 388. While the court in Downs
did not speak in terms of undue influence, this was arguably the de facto conclusion
of the court. See also In re Baby Girl D , 512 Pa. 449, 517 A.2d 925 (1986).
105. 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957).
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father, before birth of the child, to pay hospital and medical
expenses in connection with the care of the mother and
child. There is nothing in this practice inimical to public
policy. Indeed, it is productive of the welfare of the child
that the child and the mother have adequate medical attention which perhaps would not otherwise be provided.lo6
Payments made to the biological parents simply for their own benefit,
however, constitute baby-selling.'07 Other courts have endorsed the
distinction between payments for the benefit of the child and those for
the benefit of the biological parents.Io8
The extensive consent provisions in adoption statutes reflect a
recognition by the states that an agreement to surrender a child for
adoption is different in kind, not just in degree, from an ordinary
commercial contract. Thus, special measures must be taken to ensure
that the consent of the biological parents is valid. T o ensure that
the consent of the biological parents is informed, many states prohibit
them from giving pre-birth consent; to ensure that it is voluntary,
states prohibit them from being paid to consent to the surrender of
their child.
2.

Prohibition of Baby-Selling

Baby-selling or baby-brokering is prohibited irrespective of whether
there is consent by the biological parents. Every state prohibits
baby-selling,'Og either through adoption statutes, penal codes, or

106. Id. at 196, 307 P.2d at 184.
107. Id.
108. Franklin v. Biggs, 14 O r . App. 450, 513 P.2d 1216 (1973) (Court held
that consent was vitiated, and set aside an adoption decree, in part because of a
$200 payment made by the adoptive parents to the biological mother for her to
leave the state.); Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 293 N.W.2d 90 (1980) (Agreement to pay for medical expenses which had already been paid by the Department
of Public Welfare vitiated the biological mother's consent.).
109. While the laws of each state vary, an example is MD. FAM.LAWCODE
ANN.5 5-327 (1984), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) An agency, institution, or individual who renders any service in
connection with the placement of an individual for adoption may not
charge or receive from or on behalf of either the natural parent of the
individual to be adopted, or from o r on behalf of the individual who
is adopting the individual, any compensation for the placement.
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otherwise.'1° Such prohibitions against baby-selling are a recognition

110. ALA. CODE4 26-10-8 (1986) ("It shall be unlawful for any [unlicensed]
person . . . to advertise that they will adopt children or . . . hold out inducements
to parents to part with their offspring . . . ."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 4 8-114
(1987) ("[A] person . . . shall not be directly o r indirectly compensated for giving
or obtaining consent to place a child for adoption."); CAL. PENALCODE 4 273
(West 1988) ("It is a misdemeanor for any person . . . to pay money o r anything
of value, to a parent for the placement for adoption . . . of his child."); COLO.
REV. STAT. 5 19-5-213 (Supp. 1987) ("No person shall . . . charge, or receive any
money or other consideration o r thing of value in connection with the relinquishment
and adoption . . . ."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 5 928 (1975) ("No person or
organization who is in any way connected with a n adoption shall receive any
remuneration in connection therewith . . . ."); FLA,. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West
Supp. 1987) ("It is unlawful for any person . . . [t]o sell or surrender, or to arrange
for the sale or surrender of, a child to another person for money or anything of
value or to receive such minor child for such payment o r thing of value."); GA.
CODEANN. 4 19-8-19 (1982) ("It shall . . . be unlawful for any . . . [unlicensed]
person . . . directly or indirectly to hold out inducements to parents to part with
their children."); IDAHOCODE5 18-1511 (1987) ("Any person . . . who shall sell
o r barter any child for adoption or for any other purpose, shall be guilty of a
felony . . . ."); ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 40, para. 1526 (1980) ("No person . . . except
a child welfare agency . . . shall receive or accept, or pay o r give any compensation
or thing of value . . . for placing out of a child . . . ."); IND. CODE A N N . 4 3546-1-9 (Burns 1985) ("[A] person who, with respect to adoption, . . . receives any
property in connection with the . . . adoption . . . commits . . . a . . . felony.");
IOWACODEA N N .5 600.9 (West 1983) ("Any person assisting in any way with the
placement or adoption of a minor person shall not charge a fee which is more
than usual, necessary, and commensurate with the services rendered."); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. 4 199.590 (MichieIBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) ("No person ... . may
sell o r purchase o r procure for sale or purchase any child for the purpose of
adoption . . . ."); M D . FAM.LAWCODEANN. 4 5-327 (1984) ("An . . . individual
who renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual for
adoption may not . . . receive . . . any compensation for the placement."); MASS.
ANN.LAWSch. 210, 4 11A (Law. Co-op. 1986) (No person shall "accept payment
in the form of money o r other consideration in return for placing a child for
adoption."); M I C H . COMP. LAWSA N N . 4 710.54 (West Supp. 1988) ("[A] person
shall not offer, give, or receive any money o r other consideration o r thing of value
in connection with . . . [tlhe placing of a child for adoption."); NEV. REV. STAT.
4 127.290 (1987) ("[Nlo person who does not have . . . a license to operate a
child-placing agency may request or accept . . . any compensation . . . for placing,
arranging the placement of, o r assisting in placing or arranging the placement of,
any child for adoption . . . ."); N.J. STAT.A N N .4 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1988) ("No
person . . . shall . . . [tlake, receive, accept or agree to accept any money or any
valuable consideration" in connection with an adoption.); N.Y. Soc. SERV.LAW
§ 374 (McKinney 1983) ("[Nlo person may . . . receive any compensation . . . in
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on the part of the states that the placement of a child with an
adoptive family should be based on the best interests of the child,
not on the profit motive of the individual arranging the p l a ~ e m e n t . " ~
Therefore, no state permits a person to profit from the independent
placement of a child for a d ~ p t i o n . "For
~ example, if the attorney,
physician, or other intermediary who arranges an independent adoption were permitted to profit from the transaction, the temptation
would arise to place the child with adoptive parents who would pay
the highest price for the child rather than with parents who would
act in the child's best interest.'I3 In fact, one criticism of independent

connection with . . . adoption of a child . . . ."); N . C . G E N . STAT.5 48-37 (1984)
(No unlicensed placement organization shall "offer or give, charge or accept
any . . . compensation . . . for receiving or placing, arranging the placement of,
or assisting in placing or arranging the placement of, any child for adoption.");
OHIOREV. CODEANN. 5 3107.10 (Baldwin 1988) (Petitioner in any proceeding
for the adoption of a minor child permitted to pay only for prenatal care, including
hospital care, attorneys' fees, agency expenses, and temporary costs of routine
maintenance for the child.); O R . REV. STAT. § 109.31 1 (Supp. 1988) ("No person
shall charge, accept or pay . . . a fee for locating a minor child for adoption . . . .");
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWSA N N . 5 25-6-4.2 (1984) ("Any person who . . . receives any
money or other consideration or thing of value in connection with the placing of
any child for adoption . . . is guilty of a . . . felony."); T E N N .CODEANN. 5 361-135 (1984) ("It is unlawful for any [unlicensed] person . . . [t]o [receive,] sell
or surrender a child . . . for money or anything of value . . . ."); UTAH CODE
ANN.5 76-7-203 (1978) ("Any person . . . who sells, or disposes of, . . . any child
for and in consideration of the payment of money o r other thing of value is guilty
of a felony . . . ."); W ~ s c .STAT. ANN. 5 946.716 (1982) ("Whoever . . . [fjor
anything of value, solicits, negotiates or arranges the placement of a child for
adoption" is guilty of a felony.). See Katz, supra note 4, at 6-10. T h e United States
Constitution, which prohibits slavery, and thus the sale of human beings, also
prohibits baby-selling. U.S. CONST.amend. XIII.
111. See In re Baby Girl D, 512 Pa. 449, 454, 517 A.2d 925, 927 (1986)
("The reason for the limitations on fees are obvious. . . . [Tlhe limitations ensure
that children will be placed in homes that promote their needs and welfare. . . .
Although financial considerations are certainly a factor, placement of children in
adoptive homes should not rest solely on the wealth of the adoptors.") (citation
omitted).
112. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Most states do, however,
permit licensed agencies to collect fees to cover the expenses incurred in connection
with the adoption. See, e . g . , NEV. REV. STAT.5 127.290 (1987) ("A licensed childplacing agency may accept fees for operational expenses."). Cf. N.J. STAT.A N N .
§ 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1977); N . C . GEN. STAT. 5 48-37 (1984); OHIOREV. CODE
5 3107.10(4) (1988); T E N N .CODEA N N . 36-1-135(a) (1984).
113. Note, supra note 56, at 50 ("The priorities present in a normal adoption
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adoptions is that at best only a superficial investigation is conducted
concerning the fitness of the prospective adoptive parents.Il4
T h e baby-selling provisions are designed to prevent the treatment
of children as chattel and to eliminate the black market.ll5 There is
a recognition that a human life is unique; it is not to be treated as
an ordinary commercial commodity.116Instead, the state has an
interest in protecting the welfare of the life involved - the child.
At least one state prevents the potential occurrence of babyselling by a n absolute prohibition against independent adoptions."'
In this state, even individuals such as priests, doctors, and lawyers
are not permitted to arrange for the placement of a child. Instead,
child placement must be conducted by a state-authorized a g e n ~ y . " ~
Other states permit independent adoptions, but in these states the

are completely reversed [in the black-market]; the welfare of the baby and the
natural mother, as well as the fitness of the adoptive parents, are subordinated to
the profit motive of the black marketeer.").
114. ADOPTION
supra note 63, at 47; Katz, supra note 4, at 11FACTBOOK,
12 ("In any private placement, especially in a black market transaction, the child
benefits from few, if any, agency safeguards. The adoptive parents need not show
the black marketeer that they are indeed fit for parenthood, only that they can
afford his fee.") (footnote omitted).
115. TASK
FORCEREPORT,supra note 3, at 39 (Baby-selling prohibition designed "'to prevent trafficking in babies, the buying and selling, in effect, of
human beings. "'), quotinf In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 58 A.D. 1,
1, 395 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (1977); Katz, supra note 4, at 10 ("[Wlhile the [babyselling] laws may vary from state to state . . . all share the basic objective of
curbing and eliminating the baby black market."). C f . Children's Aid Society v .
Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92, 66 A.2d 300, 304 (1949) ("That a child cannot be made
the subject of a contract with the same force and effect as if it were a mere chattel
has long been established law."); Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth
ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986) (Baby-selling prohibition "is
intended to keep baby brokers from overwhelming an expectant mother or the
parents of a child with financial inducements.").
See Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L . REV. 59, 60,
71-72 (1987); Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 71 A.B.A. J . 52, 54 (1985);
Note, supra note 55, at 637-38.
116. See In re Baby Girl D , 512 Pa. 449, 454, 517 A.2d 925, 927 (1986)
("[Tlhe limitation upon expenses ensures that children are not bought and sold
like commodities."); Adoption of Anonymous, 286 A.D. 161, 166, 143 N.Y.S.2d
90, 95 (1955) ("A child is not a chattel to be bought or sold."); Goodman v.
District of Columbia, 50 A.2d 812, 813 (1947).
117. See MASS. GEN. LAWSANN.ch. 210, § 11A (West Supp. 1988).
118. I d .

Heinonline - - 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.

3 0 1988-1989

19881

SURROGACY AND ADOPTION

31

intermediaries must refrain from baby-selling. The collection of any
prohibited fee by them violates state baby-selling provisions. Such
a fee converts a permissible gray-market adoption into a black-market
placement.llg Thus, no state adoption statute permits a fee to be
paid an intermediary in exchange for placing a child.

3.

The Requirement of an Investigation

In most adoptions, the biological parents do not know the identity of the adoptive parents120 so they have no way to investigate
their fitness. Even in an open adoption, when the biological parents
know or even select the adoptive parents,121 the state requires an
investigation into their fitnesslZ2and thereby assumes ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the adoptive parents are fit and that
the child's welfare is protected. Such an investigation entails a complete check of the potential adoptive parents' ability to care for a
child, including their psychological, sociological, physical, and financial ability to provide a proper home.123By conducting a

119. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
120. See, e . g . , Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957). Such
adoptions are referred to as "closed" adoptions. When the biological parents are
informed of the adoptive parents' identity, the adoption is an "open" adoption.
121. T h e biological parent may be permitted to select the adoptive home in
which he o r she wishes to place the child. See, e . g . , COLO.REV. STAT. $ 19-5-206
(Supp. 1987). T h e state, however, retains the right to investigate the adoptive
parents so selected. Id. Thus, even where the biological parents choose the adoptive
parents for their child, the state has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the
fitness of the adoptive parents, and if the couple selected by the biological parents
is found to be unfit, the child will not be placed with them.
122. See, e . g . , ALA. CODE$ 26-10-2 (1986) ("[I]t shall be the duty of the . . .
d e p a r t m e n t . . . t o make a thorough investigation . . . ."); ALASKASTAT.
$ 25.23.100 (1983) ("A reasonable investigation shall be made by the department."); ARK. STAT. ANN. $ 9-9-212 (1987) ("Upon the filing of a petition for
adoption, the court shall order a n investigation."); C O N N .GEN. STAT. ANN. $ 4561f (Supp. 1988) ("The court may, and in any contested cases shall, request . . .
an investigation . . . ."). See also ADOPTIONFACTBOOK,
supra note 63, at 74-85;
infra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
123. See, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 8-105 (Supp. 1987), which
provides in pertinent part:
This investigation . . . shall consider all relevant and material facts
dealing with the prospective adoptive parents' fitness to adopt children,
and shall include but is not limited to:
1. A complete social history.
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comprehensive investigation of the prospective adoptive parents, the
state limits those who are permitted to adopt to persons who the
state believes will act in the child's best interest.
Some states do not require an investigation when the person
adopting the child is a stepparent,lZ4but most either require an
investigation as they would in an adoption by an unrelated couple125
or provide that the investigation may be waived when appropriate.lZ6

2.
3.
4.
5.

The
The
The
The

financial condition of the applicant.
moral fitness of the applicant.
religious background of the applicant.
physical and mental health condition of the applicants.

9. All other facts bearing on the issue of the fitness of the prospective
adoptive parents that the court, agency or division may deem relevant.
See also MONT.CODEANN. 5 40-8-122 (1987) (Investigation shall include medical
and social histories of the adoptive parents along with all other relevant circumstances.); ALA.CODE§ 26-10-2 (1986) (A "thorough" investigation must be made including an investigation of the moral, physical and financial fitness of the proposed
adoptive parents.).
124. See, e . g . , ALA. CODE 5 26-10-2 (1986) ("The department . . . is no
longer required to investigate petitions of stepfathers [or] stepmothers . . . .");
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105 (Supp. 1987) (Provisions requiring investigation
"shall not apply . . . where the prospective adoptive parent is the spouse of the
natural parent of the child.").
125. See, for example, CAL. CIV. CODE 5 227a (West Supp. 1985), which
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, the probation
officer or, at option of the board of supervisors, the county welfare
department . . . shall make an investigation of each case of adoption
by a stepparent where one natural parent retains custody and control
of the child. No order of adoption shall be made by the court until
after the probation officer has filed his or her or welfare department
has filed its report and recommendation and it has been considered by
the court.
126. See, e . g . , ARK. STAT.A N N .5 9-9-212 (1987) ("The court may . . . waive
the requirement for an investigation report when a stepparent is the peti.
ANN.5 45-63a (Supp. 1988) ("[Iln the case of a child
tioner . . . ."); C O N N STAT.
sought to be adopted by a stepparent, the court . . . may waive all requirements . . .
for investigation . . . ."); IDAHOCODE5 16-1506 (Supp. 1988) ("At the hearing
the court may deny the application, enter a final decree approving the adoption
if it is satisfied that the adoption is for the best interests of the child, or order an
investigation."); ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 40, para. 1508 (Supp. 1988) (An "investigation shall not be made when the petition seeks to adopt a related child . . .
unless the court, in its discretion, shall so order."); M o . ANN.STAT. 5 453.070
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The rationale for making the investigation discretionary in these
circumstances is presumably that a full investigation is not required
in order to protect the child's best interest in every case of a stepparent adoption. For example, in a case involving the death of one
of the child's natural parents, the state may wish to retain the
flexibility of dispensing with a full investigation when the remaining
spouse, who has sole custody of the child, remarries. The state could
not and would not want to prevent the remaining parent from
remarrying.I2' Therefore, since the stepparent would be present in
the home, the only issue would be his or her legal relationship to
the child. More often than not, it would be more beneficial for the
child to be legally adopted than for the stepparent to forego the
adoption. Thus, in a stepparent adoption, there may be factors other
than the child's best interest - keeping the child with at least one
biological parent and fostering the marriage relationship - at issue.128
It is important to remember, though, that most states provide some
mechanism for investigation, even of stepparents, which can be utilized
when necessary.
The foregoing policies reflected in the adoption process are
designed to protect all parties involved. By requiring that the biological parents give informed consent they are protected from improper termination of their parental rights. The adoptive parents
are also protected by the consent provision because valid consent
ensures the child's availability for adoption. The prohibition of babyselling protects the child from being placed based on improper criteria
which might totally ignore the child's best interests. Finally, the
investigation of the adoptive parents is the state method of ensuring
that they are fit to raise a child. With these policies established, a

(Vernon 1986) (Investigation may be waived where one of the petitioners is the
natural parent of the child.); N . M . STAT. ANN. § 40-7-46 (1985); N.D. CENT.
5 14-15-1 1 (1981); S.D. CODIFIEDLAWSANN. § 25-6-10 (1984) (investigation of
stepparent discretionary); WIS. STAT. ANN. 48.88 (West 1987) (limited investigation of stepparent). T h e fact that the investigation may be waived does not
necessarily mean that the stepparent will be permitted to adopt the child. The
court may still determine that the adoption is not in the child's best interest or
order an investigation to make that determination.
127. For a discussion of the public policy favoring the marriage relationship,
see supra note 40.
128. But see In re R . H . N . , 710 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1985) (best interests of child
governs even in a stepparent adoption).
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determination must be made of their compatibility with surrogate
parenting agreements.

A.

Absence of Voluntary, Informed Consent

Surrogate parenting agreements impair the ability of the surrogate to give voluntary informed consent in two respects. First,
requiring the surrogate to consent to the surrender of the child before
conception deprives her of informed consent. Second, the fee she
receives in exchange for that consent renders the consent involuntary.
Either factor is sufficient in itself to vitiate the surrogate's consent.
Requiring the surrogate to consent to the termination of her
parental rights not only prior to the birth of the child, but also prior
to conception is clearly incompatible with state adoption laws which
require that consent be given only after birth. T h e laws prohibiting
pre-birth consent are designed to ensure that the biological mother
is not forced to make a hasty or ill-considered decision.lZ9 The
surrogate agrees not only to act as a surrogate and to bear a child,
but also to surrender that child. The final consent by the surrogate
to surrender the child is hastened because it is given before conception
and before the child is born. This practice ignores the psychological
and emotional aspects of pregnancy and childbirth and puts the
surrogate in an equally if not more difficult situation than a biological
mother facing a traditional adoption decision.130 Regardless of the

129.

See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
130. Of course, a woman's consent to become a surrogate and to surrender
the child to the biological father at birth is arguably quite different from the consent
of an expectant mother to surrender her child for adoption. T h e concern about a
woman making a hasty decision is theoretically minimized in the surrogate context.
In the adoption context, the woman is already pregnant and a decision must be
made, within a relatively short period of time, as to who will raise the child. In
a surrogate parenting situation, the biological mother is not pregnant at the time
consent is given. T h e surrogate simply decides that she will bear a child for the
adopting couple. There is no sense of urgency as might be experienced by one
who is already pregnant. Moreover, the decision to become a surrogate may evolve
over a prolonged period of time. As the one recent report explains, however:
[slome commentators suggest that surrogacy poses less risk to women
than the surrender of a child for adoption in other circumstances because
a surrogate becomes pregnant with the intention of giving the child
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amount of time the surrogate has to consider her decision prior to
signing the surrogate parenting agreement, she cannot accurately
anticipate whether she will in fact be willing to give the child up
for adoption once he o r she is born.l3I A bonding process occurs
between mother and child during pregnancy which the current surrogate parenting process ignores.132The surrogate is asked to consent
to the surrender of the child before such bonding occurs and before
she has an opportunity to know how the pregnancy will affect her
emotionally.Is3 By being forced to make this emotion-laden decision
in an untimely fashion, the surrogate is deprived of her right to
informed consent.
In Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth ex rel. Arrn~trong,'~~
the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that a surrogate who
consented to surrender the child to the biological father prior to the
child's birth had the right to change her mind. The court concluded
that the surrogate parenting agreement was voidable because the
timing of the surrogate's consent was inappropriate based upon the
Kentucky adoption laws. As the court explained:

away. However, it is also possible that the risk is aggravated for sur- .
rogates, many of whom have been found to be emotionally or psychologically vulnerable before entering the surrogacy contract. For example,
one study of potential surrogates revealed that one-third felt they were
' I
atoning" for an abortion o r for a previous child relinquished for
adoption. Another study of 30 women who had babies as surrogates
found that all the women experienced some degree of grief. T e n percent
were so distraught after relinquishing the infant that they sought therapeutic counseling.
TASK
FORCEREPORT,supra note 3 , at 24-25.
131. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; infra note 137-139.
132. See Gaffney, supra note 88, at 91-95 (discussing maternal-fetal bonding
process).
133. In some instances the organization arranging the surrogate agreement
prefers to use surrogates who already have other children. TASK
FORCEREPORT,
supra note 3, at 25 ("Surrogates generally have from one to three living children
(a requirement for acceptance at some parenting clinics). . . ."). T h e fear may be
that a woman who has never had a child cannot know how she will be affected
by the birth of the baby and is more likely to decide to try to keep it. O n the
other hand, one surrogate organization, Surrogate Parenting Associates, has stated
that the reason for using only surrogates who already have children is that their
fertility has been established. Telephone interview with Loretta Bradshaw, Surrogate Parenting Associations (Mar. 2, 1989).
134. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
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The surrogate mother's consent given before five days following birth of the baby is no more legally binding than
the decision of an unwed mother during her pregnancy that
she will put her baby up for adoption. The five days' consent
feature . . . in the consent to adoption statute (KRS
199.500(5)) take[s] precedence over the parties' contractual
commitments, meaning that the surrogate mother is free to
change her mind.'35
The court in Surrogate Parenting Associates, and the Kentucky
legislature which provided the five days' consent feature, were undoubtedly sensitive to the psychological aspects of pregnancy and
childbirth. Mental health professionals who understand the bonding
process that occurs during pregnancy recognize that a surrogate's
decision to surrender a child may be extremely difficult to honor
once the child is born.'36 Accordingly, at least one mental health
expert has suggested that a woman be required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation before being permitted to become a surrogate and
that such an evaluation must specifically include detailed discussions
about the surrogate's "potential for changing her mind about relinquishing the baby after delivery and keeping the newborn."137 The
author, a psychiatrist, asks "[hlow well can a surrogate mother
applicant understand and comprehend, prior to the artificial insemination, how she will feel when she relinquishes the
Good

135. Id. at 212-213. The court did not, however, hold that surrogate parenting
agreements violate public policy, concluding instead that such a decision was for
the legislature to make. T h e court explained:
[Tlhe threshold question is whether the legislation on the books declares
the procedure impermissible. Short of such legislation it is not for the
courts to cut off solutions offered by science. . . . We have consistently
held that our Kentucky Constitution empowers the legislative branch,
but not the judicial branch, of government to articulate public policy
regarding health and welfare.
Id. at 213.
136. See Parker, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 8 , at 24.
1 3 7 . Id. at 24-26.
138. Id. at 27. The author concludes that there is insufficient data to answer
this question. H e notes that "further research needs to be done on the adequacy
of the various techniques to help assure the informed nature of the consent for
the psychological issues." Id. See also Burt, Judicial Enforcement Seen Inappropriate,
119 N . J . L . J . 328 (1987) ("How can a court order a pregnant woman not to form
an emotional bonding, a 'parent-child relationship' with the baby in her womb?").
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psychiatric or psychological counseling is not a perfect determinant
of which women will have difficulty surrendering the child.'39 T h e
medical profession recognizes the psychological difficulty, if not impossibility, of giving voluntary, informed consent prior to birth. T h e
adoption laws are evidence that the legal community also recognizes
this difficulty; many states mandate that consent be given after
birth.I4O Thus, the legal community, through traditional adoption
laws, recognizes the emotional aspects of pregnancy and childbirth
and incorporates measures designed to deal with this.I4l T h e modern
"surrogate adoption," however, fails to recognize that a woman,
even one who has given birth in the past, may not be able to predict
her emotional state when the child she has agreed to surrender is
born pursuant to the surrogate parenting agreement. A surrogate's
consent should be deemed invalid if she makes this decision prior
to the birth of the ~ h i 1 d . Not
l ~ ~ only should the surrogate parenting
agreement be voidable based on this factor alone, but the surrogate
should be informed after the child's birth that she has the right to

139. But see Parker, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 8 , at 27. Parker implies
that with adequate psychiatric counseling, few women who pass the psychological
screening will change their mind. H e concedes, however, that there is insufficient
data with which to make a conclusive determination on this point.
140. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
141. See, e . g . , Hendrix v. Hunter, 99 G a . App. 785, 796, 110 S.E.2d 35,
40 (1959) (Although court found consent was valid where mother of illegitimate
child signed adoption consents both before and after the birth of the child, the
court acknowledged that child "welfare agencies prefer that the mothers of illegitimate children see their offspring before consenting to adoption.").
142. "Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before
she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally
voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's
birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed . . . ." In re Baby M , 109 N.J.
396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988).
See TASK
FORCEREPORT,
supra note 3, at 124 ("Many of the [New York State]
Task Force members support the nonenforceability of surrogate contracts, in part
because they believe that it is not possible for women to give informed consent to
the surrender of a child prior to the child's conception and birth. Some commentators have argued that this conclusion diminishes women's stature as autonomous
adults. T h e Task Force members reject that assertion.").
See also Wolf, supra note 9, at 400 ("A parent can be unexpectedly smitten
with profound connection to the newborn child at birth, and a parent who tries
(for whatever reason) to give a child away, can find it impossible to go through
with the parting. ").
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void the contract. Without this information being expressly provided
to her, the surrogate is unlikely to believe that she has the freedom
to renege on her agreement.143In turn, even her continued acquiescence after the baby's birth may not be considered inf01-rned.I~~
Surrogate parenting agreements, by ignoring the fact that bonding
occurs during pregnancy, are voidable for want of informed consent
on the part of the surrogate.
The foregoing issues involving informed consent are analogous
to the tort doctrine of informed consent which involves consent to

143. Approximately 6 0 % of the women in Parker's study were working o r
had a working spouse. Although 26% had taken some college courses only one
had a bachelor's degree. Parker, Motivation, supra note 8 , at 117. In Baby M, M a r y
Beth Whitehead, the surrogate, left high school at age 15 while in the middle of
the tenth grade. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 338, 525 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Super. C t . App.
Div. 1987). It therefore appears that the typical surrogate has no legal training.
Moreover, she may not be financially able to gain easy access to legal counsel.
While the organization may arrange for legal counsel to be provided to the surrogate,
it is questionable whether the legal counsel she receives will be unbiased. At
Surrogate Parenting Associates (SPA), for example, the following description has
been given of the legal counsel that the surrogate receives:
T h e [surrogate] . . . sees a n attorney at the clinic. SPA recommends
the same attorneys regularly because of their familiarity with the agreements. This continuing relationship between the attorney and the company raises ethical questions about the representation of the surrogate
mother during contract negotiations. Since the company has an interest
in keeping the surrogate's fee as low as possible and thus increasing
its volume of business, an attorney with ties to the company may have
a conflict of interest. I n one account, a woman requested to see a private
attorney. T h e company recommended against this, and suggested a
lawyer often used by other surrogate mothers. This attorney explained
the contract to the prospective mother within earshot of a company
official who recorded all the questions she asked.
Note, An Incomplete Picture, supra note 7, at 239-40.
T h e lack of adequate counselling has been deemed sufficient to vitiate consent
in a traditional adoption case. See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 60 Misc. 2d 854,
304 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1969). I n Anonymous, the 13 year-old biological mother received
no legal advice and was informed that the private placement adoption was temporary. While Anonymous is a rather extreme case, it illustrates that lack of adequate
counselling can, under appropriate circumstances, vitiate consent.
144. See, e . g . , Baby M , 109 N . J . at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248 ("[Alny decision
after [the baby's birth] compelled by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the
threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally
voluntary. ").
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medical treatment.145Under the doctrine of informed consent, a n
individual who receives medical treatment has a right to be informed
of all the material risks involved with the p r 0 ~ e d u r e . As
l ~ ~one court
has described it, "a physician violates his duty to his patient and
subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient."I4'
"Any" facts includes the fact that a given procedure involves certain
psychological as well as physical risks. Thus, informed consent entails
ensuring that the patient "understand[s] the risk of undesirable
consequence^"'^^ - both physical and psychological.149Because
145. T h e surrogate parenting agreement requires the surrogate to undergo
the medical procedure of artificial insemination, a procedure for which informed
supra note 83, at 158 ("A.I.D. [artificial inconsent is required. F. ROSOVSKY,
semination by donor] is a medical intervention or intrusion into another person's
body [that] cannot be overlooked: it triggers the need for fully informed consent.").
In addition to the issue of informed consent, artificial insemination creates potential
legal problems in terms of the legitimacy of the child born pursuant thereto and
who is perceived as the legal father of the child. Id. I n Connecticut, for example,
"[alny child or children born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire,
in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband
and wife who consented to and requested the use of A.I.D." C O N N .GEN. STAT.
§ 45-69.i (1980). In states with similar provisions, the child born pursuant to the
surrogate agreement will be considered the legitimate child of the surrogate and
her husband, rather than the legal child of the biological father. I n order to
circumvent provisions of this sort, the husband of the surrogate may expressly
refuse to consent to the artificial insemination. See MBW Contract, supra note 9,
at Exhibit G , in which Richard Whitehead, the surrogate's husband states: "I,
R I C H A R D WHITEHEAD, husband of M A R Y B E T H W H I T E H E A D , . . . expressly withhold and refuse to consent to any artificial insemination in connection
with the surrogate parenting procedures proposed by my wife. I recognize that by
refusing to consent to the insemination, I cannot be declared or considered to be
the legal father of said child conceived thereby."
S 32, at 189-91 (5th
146. See PROSSERA N D KEETONO N T H E LAW OF TORTS
ed. 1984); Plant, An Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM
L. REV. 639 (1968).
147. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d
560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957). In the surrogate parenting context, an issue
might arise as to who has the duty to ensure that the surrogate receives informed
consent. T h e physician who performs the insemination may be unaware that it is
for the purpose of conceiving a child pursuant to a surrogate parenting agreement.
Arguably, then, there should be a shared responsibility between the physician who
performs the insemination and the organization that brings the contracting parties
together to ensure that the surrogate's right to informed consent is satisfied.
148. PROSSER
A N D KEETON,
supra note 146, § 18, at 120.
149. See supra note 147. T h e consequences of the treatment of artificial insemination include pregnancy and the risks associated with it and childbearing.
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informed consent requires that the patient be informed of and understand the material risks associated with a particular treatment,
informed consent is a "process" rather than a simple "form" that
the patient must sign.I5O This process involves a n exchange of information between the doctor and patient. I n the case of surrogate
parenting, the requisite interchange should involve more than a simple
question of whether the patient understands the risks and her affirmative or negative response. The surrogate should be required to
explain to the satisfaction of the doctor that she in fact understands
the risks. Even then, she should be permitted to give final consent
to the termination of her parental rights only after the child is born.
Under the doctrine of informed consent, the issue generally is
not whether the patient has consented to a particular treatment.l5I
Normally the patient has consented to the treatment, but later claims
that he or she was not informed of the material risks associated with
that treatment. A successful claim that informed consent was lacking
requires the patient to show that she (1) was not informed of the
material risks,152(2) was injured, and (3) would not have consented

150. F. ROSOVSKY,
supra note 83, at 2-3 ("Many people think of consent to
treatment as a form. Consent is equated in their minds with the document through
which patients agree to [medical] procedures . . . . Such a definition is incorrect
and misleading. . . . Consent is a process, not a form. . . . [Clonsent is the dialogue
between the patient and the provider of services in which both parties exchange
information. ").
151. If the patient has not consented to the treatment at all, the doctor may
be liable for assault and battery. See, e . g . , Mohr v . Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104
N . W . 12 (1905). In the typical case of informed consent, however, the patient
consents to the treatment, but later claims that he or she was unaware of certain
material risks associated with the treatment. In this situation, the patient's claim
against the doctor would normally be based on negligence. See, e . g . , Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U . S . 1064 (1973).
T h e r e are, however, some jurisdictions which continue to base even the latter type
of consent case on assault and battery. See, e . g . , Spikes v . Heath, 332 S.E.2d 889
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892, 263 S.E.2d 69 (1980).
152. With respect to the adequacy of the information conveyed to the patient,
two different standards are used in this country. T h e first standard requires the
physician to disclose risks that are customarily disclosed in the community. See,
e . g . , Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1981); Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark.
476, 597 S.W.2d 88 (1980). The second standard requires the physician to disclose
the material risks which a reasonable person in the patient's position would want
to know. See, e . g . , Price v. Hurt, 71 1 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. C t . App. 1986); Logan
v. Greenwich Hospital Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983); Wheeldon v.
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to the treatment had she been informed of the material risks.Is3
Even assuming that a legitimate attempt is made to advise the
surrogate of the risks involved in the procedure, the informed consent
doctrine raises two issues in the surrogate context. The first issue
is whether consent can justifiably be sought; the second is whether
it is possible for a surrogate to understand, prior to conception, the
psychological risks she is taking. In the area of human experimentation, it is acknowledged that, before consent is sought, a determination should be made that the procedure itself is justifiable and
probably in the patient's interest. For example, one commentator
has questioned the justification for seeking consent from patients for
an artificial heart.Is4 He suggests that if the procedure is not justifiable
or the probability is that it is not in the patient's interest, the patient's
consent to the treatment should not be s 0 ~ g h t . lThere
~~
are undoubtedly significant differences between the life and death decision
involved when a patient must decide whether or not to receive an

Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 374 (S.D. 1985). T h e trend is to use the second
standard. F. R o s o v s ~ y ,supra note 83, at 42.
153. F. R o s o v s ~ supra
~ , note 83, at 7. See also Harnish v . Children's Hospital
Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982); Woolley v. Henderson,
418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676
(1972).
154. See Annas, Death and the Magic Machine: Informed Consent to the Artificial
Heart, 9 WEST. NEW ENC. L. REV. 89, 90 (1987) ("Prior to the conversation
[involving possible risks] and offer of an experimental intervention, an independent
judgment must be made that the proposed therapy . . . is a reasonable medical
experiment from both a scientific and public policy perspective. This is necessary
to protect the patient's welfare; to prevent patients from being demeaned and
dehumanized by accepting offers they are in no position to refuse.") (emphasis in
original).
155. T h e concern in the context of experimental medical procedures is that
the physicians involved may want to do the procedure in order to enhance their
own knowledge rather than to further the patient's interest. Id. at 92 ("[The
physician] seemed unaware o f . . . his own conflict of interest between wanting to
perform the world's second human heart transplant for himself, and attempting
to convince [the patient] that the operation was in [the patient's] best interests.").
In a surrogate arrangement, the threat of the patient's interests being subordinated
to the interests of the other parties is much greater. T h e surrogate agreement does
not purport to be an agreement designed to benefit the surrogate, except financially.
The procedure is clearly designed to benefit the adopting couple and the organization that brings the parties together for a fee. Thus, even greater safeguards
need to be implemented to ensure that the surrogate is given as much information
about the procedure as possible.
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artificial heart and a surrogate's decision to become impregnated by
artificial insemination and to surrender the child born pursuant
thereto to the adopting couple at birth. While artificial insemination
may no longer be considered physical human experimentation, surrogate parenting may be considered psychological human experim e n t a t i ~ n .Thus,
' ~ ~ it is essential that the surrogate be fully informed
of the risks she is undertaking.
The surrogate may be less likely, however, to receive adequate
counselling and information than the patient undergoing physical
human experimentation such as the implantation of an artificial heart.
The doctor who implants an artificial heart hopes that the patient's
health will improve. The overall purpose is to advance medical
techniques in order to prolong life. T h e participants in a surrogate
agreement, however, are not primarily, or even secondarily, concerned with the surrogate's welfare. The adopting couple is primarily
concerned with obtaining a baby. T h e organization which brings the
parties together is a business enterprise which is interested primarily
in making a profit.15' Accordingly, an extra effort must be made to

156. "Experiment" has been defined a s "[tlhe process of testing," BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY
519 (5th ed. 1979), o r as "any action o r process designed to
find out whether something is effective, workable [or] valid," WEBSTER'SNEW
WORLDDICTIONARY
493 (2d Coll. Ed. 1984). It has also been defined as "any
action o r process undertaken to discover something not yet known." Id. Surrogate
transactions arguably involve a process designed to discover whether women are
generally capable, emotionally and psychologically, of giving consent prior to
conception to surrender their child to another couple and terminate their parental
rights.
157. At Surrogate Parenting Associates (SPA), the Kentucky organization
which facilitates surrogate transactions, "a couple receives the benefits of SPA'S
screening, matchmaking, and medical services . . . [flor a fee that generally starts
at $25,000." Note, An Incomplete Picture, supra note 7, at 237. SPA does, however,
provide for some psychological screening of the surrogate:
[Tlhe prospective mother . . . travels to [SPA] for a two-day visit.
During her stay, she undergoes psychiatric interviews and a battery of
intelligence and basic personality tests. This testing is designed to analyze the surrogate mother's ability to surrender her child after delivery,
and to reveal the personality disorders or low intelligence.
Id. at 239.
While the counselling mechanism has been established, it is not clear that the
counselling is adequate. "In one firsthand account, the interview with the psychologist [at SPA] involved only basic questions and inquiries about future plans.
T h e intelligence test was omitted, since the woman was 'obviously bright."' Id.
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ensure that the surrogate is adequately advised of all the risks of
artificial insemination, including, in the case of surrogacy, the psychological risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Even when
the surrogate is so advised, her final consent must be given after
the birth of the child because it is not possible to understand, prior
to conception, the psychological risks she is taking.158
The consent of the surrogate to surrender the child is also invalid
because the surrogate parenting scheme contemplates that a fee over
and above actual medical and/or legal expenses will be paid by the
adopting couple to the surrogate. Surrogates have proffered a variety
of reasons for their decisions to agree to surrogacy. Some assert that
their main objective is to give the gift of life to another c 0 u p 1 e . l ~ ~
Others acknowledge that they acted as surrogates because of the
financial incentive.I6OWhatever their professed reasons, it is generally
agreed that if there were no fee paid to surrogates, the practice
would all but disappear.I6l Thus, although very few studies have
been conducted on the motivations of women who agree to act as
surrogates, the information that is available suggests that they are,
to a significant degree, financially needy162and that the financial
incentive for entering into a surrogate parenting agreement is a
strong one. This financial incentive may be sufficient to induce a
woman to enter into the surrogacy agreement - an agreement she
probably would not otherwise make, and one that she may later
regret. T h e surrogate's fee particularly threatens the voluntariness
of consent of a surrogate in dire financial straits.163

158. See supra notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
159. Parker, Motivation, supra note 8 , at 117-18.
160. Id. (study on the motivations of 125 women who applied to become
surrogates found that 8 9 % of 122 women would not participate unless they received
FORCEREPORT,supra note 3, at 25.
a fee of at least $5,000). See also TASK
161. TASK
FORCEREPORT,supra note 3 , at 25.
162. In Baby M , for example, the Whiteheads filed for bankruptcy in or
about 1983. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 339, 525 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987). In addition, they had been in default on both of the two mortgages
on their home and were at one time faced with foreclosure proceedings. Id. at
340, 525 A.2d at 1140. See also TASK
FORCEREPORT,supra note 3, at 25 ("Surrogates
generally . . . are of modest or moderate financial means. One study found that
over 60% worked outside the home or had husbands who worked while 40% were
unemployed or received some sort of financial assistance or both. The annual
incomes of surrogates ranged from $6,000 to $55,000.").
163. See, c . Q . , Baby M , 109 N.J. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1241 ("[Tlhe monetary
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While the fee received by the surrogate - typically between
$10,000 and $30,000 - is not enough to make the surrogate rich,
it is sufficient to vitiate consent. Courts have held that much lower
financial incentives vitiated the biological parents' consent to an
adoption.I6*In Barwin v. Reidy, consent was vitiated when the adoptive parents paid the biological parents $400 for two children in
~
exchange for the biological parents' consent to the a d 0 p t i 0 n . l ~The
court in Barwin so held despite finding that both the biological parents
and the adoptive parents were acting out of concern for the children's
welfare.16'j If relatively small sums can vitiate the consent of the
biological parents' consent to adoption, a fortiori $10,000 should
vitiate the surrogate's consent."j7
B.

Violation of Baby Selling Prohibitions

Despite the states' well-defined public policy against baby selling,
it has been argued that surrogate parenting agreements are legitimate.

incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial circumstances, make
her decision less voluntary."). In a study on the motivations of 125 women who
applied to become surrogates, 40% of the first 50 applicants were unemployed o r
receiving some sort of financial assistance. Parker, Motivation, supra note 8 , at 117.
164. In Downs v. Wortman, 185 S.E.2d 387, 228 Ga. 315 (1971), for example,
the court held that an offer to pay airfare for the biological mother to travel between
Georgia and Illinois vitiated consent.
165. 62 N . M . 183, 196, 307 P.2d 175, 184 (1957). T h e $400 payment was
not to reimburse the biological parents for medical o r other legitimate expenses.
166. Id. at 195, 307 P.2d at 183. Cf. Hendrix v. Hunter, 110 S.E.2d 35,
41, 99 G a . App. 785, 793 (1959) (Felton, C.J., dissenting) ("Monetary consideration to a mother, o r its equivalent, which forms the basis of a n adoption contract,
vitiates the agreement."). Cases which conclude that payment to the biological
mother does not vitiate consent involve payments to cover medical and legal fees
o r other legitimate expenses. See, e.g., Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. 35, 471
A.2d 449 (1983); Cohen v. Janic, 57 Ill. App. 2d 309, 207 N.E.2d 89 (1965).
167. Arguably no parent would give his or her child u p for adoption if they
could afford to care for it, even in a traditional adoption. Barwin, 62 N.M. at
198, 307 P.2d at 185. T h u s , even in a non-surrogate adoption, the adoptive parents
are likely to be wealthier than the biological parents. Therefore, the restrictions
on payments to the biological parents should be strictly enforced to ensure that a
biological parent in dire financial straits is not induced to give his o r her child
up for adoption based on some financial incentive. Of course, parents may give
children u p for adoption for reasons independent of money. For example, teenage
mothers who conclude that they would rather not be burdened with the responsibility
of child rearing at a young age may place their children for adoption regardless
of their financial status.
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One argument advanced is that the adopting couple is not buying
a baby, but is paying the surrogate for her services.'G8 Another
argument is that the evil that the baby-selling statutes were enacted
to prevent does not exist in surrogate arrangements.IG9Neither argument is compelling.
T h e argument that the payment made to the surrogate is for
her services rather than for the right to adopt the child places form
over s u b ~ t a n c e . "While
~
the surrogate parenting agreement may state
that the fee is for the surrogate's services, such a statement is not
supported by the facts. An examination of the fee structure of a
typical surrogate parenting agreement reveals that the fee paid to
the surrogate is not just for the surrogate's services, but rather is a
fee for the purchase of the baby itself. In the typical surrogate
parenting agreement, the surrogate's fee ranges from $10,000 to

168. Keane, supra note 7, at 152-59.
169. Id. at 154. See also Katz, supra note 4. A third consideration is whctl~cr
the biological father, who is genetically related to the child, can be said to li,t\.c*
purchased his own child. O n e commentator concludes that the Thirteenth Amentlment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits slavery and thus the salt.
and purchase of human beings, also prohibits surrogacy. Means, supra note 1 , 211
478-79. "A modern father . . . has, by virtue of his paternity, his own parental
rights to the child. What he does not have is the mother's parental rights. Salt.
of her parental rights is the equivalent of sale of the child." Id. at 449 n.18. C'.
Hawkins v. Frye, 1988 W L 59841 (Del. Fam. C t . May 25, 1988) (West). There
a divorcing couple contractually agreed to terminate the father's parental rights.
T h e court, finding that this provision violated public policy, explained:
Although this case does not involve a parent receiving money for placing
his child for adoption as did [Baby M I , it does involve terminating one's
parental rights, the effect of which would be to avoid paying child
support. This smacks of the same forbidden motivation: giving u p a
child for monetary benefit.
Id. at 6.
If the surrogate were a gestational surrogate only, gestating a fetus created
by the adopting couple, a question would arise regarding who would be considered
the biological mother of the child, and thus, whether the biological father would
still be purchasing the biological mother's parental rights. See supra note 5 .
170. Compare In re Baby M , 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (surrogate
parenting constitutes private placement adoption) with M B W Contract, supra note
9, at 2, which states that the fee is "compensation for services and expenses, and
in no way is to be construed as a fee for termination of parental rights or a
payment in exchange for consent to surrender a child for adoption." (This portion
of the contract is reprinted in 109 N.J. at 471, 537 A.2d at 1266.) Of course,
stating this as a proposition does not make it so.
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$30,000 plus medical and legal expenses.I7l This fee is normally held
in escrow until the surrogate releases the child to the adopting couple.
If the surrogate fails to deliver the child, the fee is reduced. I n Baby
M, for example, the contract entered into by Mary Beth Whitehead
provided that she was to receive a $10,000 fee. If she failed to
surrender the child, however, she was only entitled to receive $1,000
at most. If she miscarried prior to the fifth month, she would receive
no compensation aside from being reimbursed for her medical exp e n s e ~ . Thus,
' ~ ~ her fee, and surrogates' fees generally, are vastly
larger if they deliver a child to the adopting couple than if they fail,
for whatever reason, to deliver the child. I n effect, the surrogate is
paid a success fee. The success fee to a surrogate is analogous to
the fee paid a real estate broker upon the closing of a home sale,
an investment banker upon the closing of a financing or merger, or
any other broker upon the closing of a transaction. Thus, more
penetrating analyses recognize that the adopting couple is clearly
paying the surrogate in order to purchase a ~ h i 1 d . I ' ~
A suggestion has nevertheless been made that paying a fee to
a surrogate is legal since most states permit the payment of money
in connection with the adoption of a baby, including the payment
of medical and legal fees, payment of an adoption agency fee, and
the like.174But such fees are quite different from a separate fee for
surrendering a child. Once again, an analogy may be made between

171. See, e . g . , Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., v. Commonwealth ex ref.
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986) (In addition to the surrogate's fee,
"the [biological] father assumes responsibility for medical, hospital, travel, laboratory and other necessary expenses of the pregnancy. . . . T h e biological father
[also] pays the attorneys' fees.").
172. See MBW Contract, supra note 9, at para. 10, reprinted in 109 N.J. at
472, 537 A.2d at 1267; Baby M, 109 N.J. at 424, 537 A.2d at 1241 ("As for the
contention that the Sterns are paying only for services and not for an adoption,
we need note only that they would pay nothing in the event the child died before
the fourth month of pregnancy, and only $1,000 if the child were stillborn, even
though the 'services' had been fully rendered.").
173. See, e . g . , Wolf, supra note 9, at 388 ("We need to acknowledge and
explore the extent to which surrogacy is the payment of money for children . . . .")
(emphasis in original); Katz, supra note 4, at 22 (distinguishing surrogate parenting
agreements from baby-brokering in the black market regardless of whether the
couple "is viewed as paying the surrogate . . . for her services o r as paying for
the rights to a child").
174. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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a surrogate transaction and the purchase of a home. A purchaser
of a home normally pays legal fees, title insurance fees and many
other collateral fees in connection with the purchase. It is undisputed,
though, that the ultimate aim of the transaction is for the seller to
sell and the buyer to buy the home. Irrespective of any other expenses
involved in the transaction, the seller receives the purchase price of
the home. In a traditional adoption, the permitted payments are not
generally made to the biological mother in consideration for her
child. Rather they are made to the lawyer, the hospital, and other
persons or institutions legitimately entitled to be paid. A payment
made directly to the biological parents must be for the purpose of
reimbursing out-of-pocket expenses.175In the surrogacy context, the
adopting couple might similarly be permitted to pay such legitimate
collateral expenses of the surrogate as her medical expenses. These
expenses are the same as the collateral expenses incurred in a traditional adoption, and are analogous to the collateral expenses incurred in connection with the sale of a home. The fee paid to the
surrogate in excess of her legitimate expenses, however, constitutes
the price of the child, just as the amount paid by a buyer of a house
in excess of the collateral expenses is the price of the house. The
surrogate situation cannot be distinguished from a traditional adoption with respect to state prohibitions against baby-selling. "It is a
very short step, legally, from saying that it is acceptable for a woman
to accept money for the transfer of a child who is purposefully
conceived to saying that a woman may accept money for a child
that is accidentally conceived."176 Since a payment is being made
in exchange for the right to adopt a child, surrogate parenting
agreements violate the baby-selling statutes.
Surrogate parenting agreements violate not only the letter but
also the spirit of baby-selling statutes because their potential effect
is precisely that which the baby-selling statutes are designed to
prevent. Baby-selling prohibitions are designed to prevent commercialization of the adoption process and to prohibit treating children
as ~ h a t t e 1 . IThese
~~
laws attempt to ensure that when an adoption

175. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
176. Pierce, The "Surrogate Parenting" Issue and NCFA's Activities, NAT'LADOPT I O N R E P . ,Vo1. XIII, No. 1 , Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 1 , 5 (bi-monthly newsletter from
National Committee for Adoption.).
177. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. See also H . R . 2101, 85th Gen.
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takes place it is based on the child's best interest rather than on the
profit motive of the black-marketeer.'78 Surrogate parenting agreements are the antithesis of that p01icy.l'~
The evils that baby-selling statutes were designed to prevent are
present in the surrogacy context in three respects. First, the fee that
the surrogate
receives may induce her to act not in the child's best
interest but in her own best interest. Second, the biological father
will not necessarily behave any differently from any other unrelated
black marketeer. Third, the fee received by the organization arranging the surrogate t r a n s a c t i ~ n 'is
~ ~the organization's primary
purpose for being. It does not exist to benefit the child.
While. the few existing surrogate parenting cases are not in
agreement on whether surrogate parenting is compatible with babyselling provision^,'^^ the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Baby M

Assem., 1987 111. (In his proposed bill to prohibit surrogate parenting agreements,
Representative Granberg recognizes that "any form of commercialization in relation
to the placement o r adoption of children is immoral and contrary to the State's
goal of ensuring and protecting the welfare of children.").
178. Id. I n Baby M, 109 N.J. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1241, the court expressed
one of the evils of the baby black market as the selling of a child "without regard
for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents."
179. But see Katz, supra note 4, at 52 (The author concludes that the babyselling laws should not prohibit surrogate parenting agreements and explains that
"these statutes were not enacted with surrogate motherhood in mind and should
not be used to accomplish a purpose for which they were not designed.").
180. T h e organization charges a fee for finding the parties and for conducting
other services such as the artificial insemination. See Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986) (Surrogate Parenting Associates was "paid a fee by the biological father for selection
and artificial insemination of the surrogate . . . for obstetrical care and testing
during pregnancy, and for actual delivery."); Baby M, 109 N.J. at 424, 537 A.2d
at 1241 ("[Tlhe fee to the Infertility Center ($7,500) was stated to be for legal
representation, advice, administrative work, and other 'services.' Nevertheless, it
seems clear that the money was paid and accepted in connection with an adoption.
T h e Infertility Center's major role was first as a 'finder' of the surrogate mother
whose child was to be adopted, and second as the arranger of all proceedings that
led to the adoption."). Even Noel Keane, a strong advocate of surrogate parenting,
recognizes that "[alny broker or intermediary who brings the interested parties
together could . . . act from motives of pecuniary gain." Keane, supra note 168,
at 156.
181. Compare Surrogate Parenting Associates, 704 S.W.2d a t 209 (surrogate parenting does not violate baby-selling prohibitions), with Baby M, 109 N.J. at 396,
537 A.2d at 1227 (surrogate parenting does violate such prohibitions).
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expressed the best view: "The negative consequences of baby-buying
are potentially present in the surrogacy context, especially the potential for placing and adopting a child without regard to the interest
of the child or the natural mother."lB2 T h e court reasoned that the
natural mother's interests are neglected because she is unlikely to
receive proper counselling.183T h e child's best interests are not protected because the child will be sold to the party with the financial
means to pay, regardless of whether that party is a suitable parent.IB4
Finally, the adoptive parents' interests may not be protected. In
Baby M, the court felt that the adoptive parents might suffer, for
example, from not being informed of the medical history of the
child.
In a surrogate arrangement, both the biological mother and the
organization that brings the parties together act as independent childplacers. In the traditional adoption context, neither would be permitted to profit from the placement of a
The biological
mother does profit, though, by collecting a fee of anywhere from
$10,000 to $30,000 over and above her medical expenses. It may
be argued that, since the surrogate is the biological mother of the
child, she is more likely to provide for the child's best interest and
that the baby-selling statutes were not designed to encompass the
surrogacy arrangement. In fact, however, the fee paid to the surrogate
is an important if not the primary motivating force in a woman's
decision to act as a surrogate.IB7Thus, even the biological mother
in a surrogate arrangement treats the child as chattel at least to
some extent. The surrogate is likely to work with the couple willing
to pay her the most money, with the result that the child will likely
be awarded to the highest bidder.
Since the adopting coup1elB8is genetically related to the child
through the father, an emotional bond, at least, is expected between
the biological father and the child, which would tend to prevent the

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
parenting
biological

Baby M , 109 N . J . at 425, 537 A.2d at 1245.
I d . , 537 A.2d at 1241.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160.
In order to circumvent the baby selling statutes, the parties to a surrogate
agreement are often just the surrogate and the biological father. T h e
father arguably cannot buy his own child.
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creation of a black market in baby selling. The genetic tie, however,
between the father and child does not ensure that the child's best
interests will be served.189History demonstrates that such a bond
does not preclude baby-selling. It is well documented that during
the embarrassing time in this country when slavery was legal, white
slave masters often raped slave women, creating mulatto babies.
These slave owners, however, were not concerned with the health
and welfare of these babies and often sold them as they sold other
slaves.1g0Thus the mere existence of a genetic link did not ensure
that an emotional bond existed or that the father would not be willing
to sell the child to another individual at the right price. Of course,
the racial considerations which were present at that time made such
a practice almost acceptable. Such racial considerations are unlikely
to be present in the surrogacy context. Other considerations, however, could arise which would create the same potential for the
creation of a black-market. T h e child could, for example, be born
with physical and/or mental handicaps. I n such a case, the surrogate
parenting agreement would normally provide that the adopting couple
agrees to take legal responsibility for the child.Ig1 T h e adopting
couple, however, may not necessarily perform as previously agreed.lg2
189. In cases of divorce or separation, many biological fathers fail to provide
for their children's best interests by neglecting to make child support payments.
See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports series P-23, No. 152,
indicating that approximately 26% of women entitled to child support in 1985
failed to receive it.
190. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED205 (1987) ("Forced to submit to
the sexual desires of their masters or of slaves selected by their masters, [black]
women then suffered the agony of watching helplessly as their children were sold
off.").
191. See M B W Contract, supra note 9, at para. 14, which provides:
WILLIAM S T E R N . . . recognizes that some genetic and congenital
abnormalities may not be detected by amniocentesis or other tests, and
therefore, if proven to be the biological father of the child, assumes the
legal responsibility for any child who may possess genetic or congenital
abnormalities.
192. In a pending Michigan case, for example, a surrogate gave birth to a
potentially handicapped child. The alleged biological father refused to take responsibility for the child and it was later determined that the actual biological
father was the surrogate's husband. Jane Doe v. Attorney General, No. 88-819032C Z (Cir. C t . for Wayne County, Mich.). Michigan has subsequently passed legislation prohibiting surrogate parenting agreements. See Surrogate Parenting Act,
1988 Mich. Legis. Serv. 420-22 (West) (to be codified at MICH.COMP.LAWSA N N .
5 722).
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They may attempt to sell the child on the black market. O r , they
may legally attempt to place the child for adoption with an unrelated
couple. In such a case, the child is unlikely to be adopted, and is
most likely to become a ward of the state.Ig3 Thus, a child who is
born with physical or mental handicaps risks being neglected, abandoned, and/or abused . I g 4

C.

Lack of a n Investigation

The fee structure used in the surrogate context also fails to
consider the adopting couple's fitness as parents since their ability
to pay the surrogate's fee rather than their fitness as parents is the
most important factor. No investigation whatsoever is required of
the adopting couple's fitness as parents. This deficiency is also inconsistent with adoption laws.
Although several states provide that an investigation need not
be conducted when a stepparent is adopting a child, most provide
that an investigation will be made if the state, in its discretion,
deems it necessary to protect the child's best interest.lg5 Thus, the
state mechanism of adoption is used to ensure that even in an
adoption by a stepparent the child's best interests are served. Moreover, in at least one jurisdiction, the provision providing for a
discretionary investigation in a stepparent adoption,Ig6has not been
applied in a surrogate situation. Instead, a full investigation of the
adoptive stepparent was required.Ig7
With surrogate arrangements the fitness of the parents is not
overseen at all. There is no mechanism for ensuring that the wife

193.

There are many handicapped children who are waiting to be adopted.
See infra notes 217-222 and accompanying text.
194. T o some extent, a handicapped child faces such risks even when both
of the parents are biological parents. T h e risks of abandonment, neglect, o r abuse
are arguably greater, however, in the surrogate context. T h e bonding between
mother and child that occurs during pregnancy and childbirth will not be experienced by the adopting couple. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Where
both parents are biological parents, at least the biological mother will have experienced that bonding process. Thus, she may be less likely to reject a handicapped
child.
195. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
196. D.C. CODEA N N . § 16-308 (Supp. 1988).
197. In re R . K . S . , 112 W . L . R . 1117 (Super. C t . ) cited in In re R . M . G . , 454
A.2d 776 (D.C. C t . App. 1982).
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of the biological father is fit. Her fitness as a parent is simply not
a factor in the equation. There are no safeguards in a surrogate
parenting arrangement to ensure that the child's best interests are
served.
With surrogate parenting, the surrogate and the adopting couple
select each other. By agreeing to work with a particular couple, it
is the surrogate who determines who should adopt the child - not
the state, as is the norm under adoption statutes.Ig8 Moreover, the
surrogate's decision may not be based on the best interest of the child.
It may be based purely on financial donsiderations.Ig9 This is not
compatible with state adoption procedures whereby, even if the biological parents indicate their preference regarding who should adopt
the child, the state has the freedom to disregard the preference if it is
not in the child's best interest.200
Surrogate parenting agreements are incompatible with ordinary
and well thought-out adoption procedures in at least three ways.
They fail to regard the best interest of the child as the primary goal.
This deficiency is reflected in the failure to provide for an investigation of the suitability of the adoptive parent. It is also reflected
in the fee structure, which violates baby-selling prohibitions. Surrogate parenting agreements also fail to protect the interests of the
biological mother because they fail to ensure that her consent to
surrender the child is voluntary and informed. Because of the failure
to comply with the adoption laws, the adopting couple is at risk
because they have no assurance that the transaction is legal.201

198. Although some states permit the biological parent to place the child,
an investigation is made to ensure that the prospective adoptive parents are fit.
See supra notes 12 1-122 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
200. Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 191-92, 307 P.2d 175, 181 (1957) (The
court "may or may not decree adoption in favor of persons recommended by the
natural parents." Even where "the natural parents have investigated the qualifications of the petitioners and given them their unqualified approval, the court
may still refuse to decree adoption, the selection of [an adoptive] parent being a
judicial act and the responsibility being that of the court.").
201. Although the public policies set forth in adoption statutes arguably should
change to reflect advances in reproductive technology, there are certain adoption
policies which must be retained if the interests of the biological parents, the adoptive
parents, the child, and, in turn, society are to be protected. See infra notes 2042 2 4 and accompanying text.
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The fact that surrogate parenting agreements as currently structured are incompatible with adoption laws does not necessarily mean
that no surrogacy contract can ever be enforced. They do, however,
need to be modified in order to bring them into compliance with
adoption laws. Moreover, surrogate agreements should be carefully
regulated by the state.

IV.

POTENTIAL
COMPATIBILITY
OF SURROGATE
PARENTING
AGREEMENTS
WITH STATEADOPTION
LAWS

A. Minimum Requirements for Consistency With Adoption
Statutes
Thirty-four states have proposed bills on the subject of surrogate
parenting. Michigan has actually enacted legislation.202Many of the
bills would, and the Michigan statute does, render surrogate parenting agreements u n e n f o r ~ e a b l e .While
~ ~ ~ this is an acceptable and

202. Surrogate Parenting Act, supra note 192. The Michigan Act, which took
effect on Sept. 1, 1988, renders surrogate parenting agreements "void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy." Id. at § 5. T h e Act encompasses both
genetic and gestational surrogates (see supra note 5) and prohibits both types of
arrangements. Id. at § 3(i). The Act makes violations a felony, "punishable by a
fine of not more than $50,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or
both." Id. at § 7(2). The Michigan Surrogate Parenting Act was already challeriged
by the Michigan Civil Liberties Union on constitutional grounds. A settlement
was reached, however, when the state attorney general agreed to an interpretation
of the statute which would permit surrogate parenting agreements to be enforced
as long as the surrogate's final consent to surrender the child is made after birth.
N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1988, at A15, col. 1.
203. See, e.g., H. 172, 1988 Ala.; A . 3200, 1988 Cal.; S. 358, 1987 Iowa;
H. 2101, 1987 111.; S. 499, 1987 Ill.; S. 4, 1988 Ky.; S. 1660, 1987 Minn.; H.
1701, 1988 Minn.; S. 2157, 1988 Miss.; S. 305, 1987 N.C.; H. 751, 1988 N . H . ;
A . 62771s. 4641, 1987 N.Y.; A. 88521s. 6891, 1988 N.Y.; A. 9882, 1988 N.Y.;
A . 11607, 1988 N.Y.; S. 4640, 1987 N.Y.; S. 386, 1987 R . I . ; S. 2518, 1988 R . I . ;
H. 237, 1988 Va.; A. 554, 1987 Wis. Some bills go so far as to impose criminal
penalties for violations of the provisions. See S. 281, 1988 N.H. (misdemeanor);
A. 13, 1988 N.J. (crime of the third degree); Title 18, 4 4305, 1987 Pa.; H. 2030,
1988 Wash. (gross misdemeanor). See also Surrogate Parenting Act, supra note 192,
at § 9.
Other bills would allow surrogate parenting agreements with restrictions. See
H. 2052, 1988 Iowa (surrogate parenting agreements permitted upon court approval); H. 2279, 1988 Iowa (permits surrogate parenting. agreements but biological
mother must sign release not less than 72 hours following the child's birth); S.
620, 1988 Kan. (voidable if no consideration); H. 1561, 1988 Mo.; H. 1108, 1988
-
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even preferable approach, it is not the only possible approach; surrogate parenting agreements could be enforced in certain circumstances. First, in order to comply with consent provisions of adoption
laws, they must not provide for the biological mother to receive a
fee over and above the reimbursements she would be entitled to
under state adoption laws.204Although this proposal may reduce or
virtually eliminate the pool of women who will agree to act as
surrogates,205it is necessary to protect the child's interests.206Second,

N . H . (court approval required); A. 956, 1988 N.J.; S. 2468, 1988 N.J.; A. 2403,
1987 N.Y.; A. 47481s'. 1429, 1987 N.Y.; A. 5529, 1987 N.Y. (prohibits consideration); A. 9857, 1988 N.Y.; H . 776, 1987 Pa.; S. 742, 1987 Pa.; H. 8419, 1988
R.I.; S. 626, 1987 S.C.; H. 549, 1988 Vt.; H . 1529, 1988 Wash.; A. 827, 1988
Wis. Many states have had multiple bills proposed ranging from complete prohibition to regulated enforceability.
I n addition to the proposed bills, a number of states have proposed and/or
established special commissions to study the issue of surrogate parenting. See S.
548, 1987 Cal.; S.J. Res. 4 , 1987 Del.; H.J. Res. 80, 1987 111.; H . 1148, 1988
Mass.; S. 239, 1987 Me.; S. 871, 1987 N.C.; H . 1098, 1988 N . H . ; A.J. Res. 5,
1988 N.J.; H . Res. 93, 1987 Pa.; S. 2413, 1988 R . I . ; H. 1 7 , 1988 Utah; H.J.
Res. 65, 1988 Va.; A.J. Res. 7 1 , 1987 Wis.
O n the national level, Democratic Representative Barbara Boxer and Republican Representative Henry Hyde are jointly sponsoring legislation against surrogate
parenting. T h e bill would make surrogate parenting contracts unenforceable and
would penalize intermediaries. H . R . 1188, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1989, at A1 1 , col. 1 .
204. For a discussion of permissible reimbursements, see supra notes 100-101
and accompanying text. The New York State Task Force, stated that the adopting
couple "would be allowed to pay the same expenses that other adoptive parents
could pay to or on behalf of a mother who consents to the adoption of her child"
but no more. TASKFORCEREPORT,supra note 3, at A-2. "Allowable expenses
would include the birth mother's medical fees and other necessary expenses arising
from her pregnancy and the child's birth. They would also include reasonable
expenses for legal services related to the adoption proceeding, but would not permit
a 'finder's fee' or payment for the child." Id.
205. Most women would not agree to act as a surrogatewithout a substantial
fee. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
206. The foregoing analysis is of little use in a situation where a child has
already been born pursuant to a surrogacy agreement or in those states that decide
to permit surrogate parenting agreements. In these situations, the issue of custody
remains. It has been suggested that a "best interest of the child" standard would
be inappropriate to decide the custody issue because it would normally result in
custody being awarded to the adopting couple who are likely to have more money
and be better educated than the surrogate. See Wolf, supra note 9, at 398-99. But
one of the major concerns about surrogacy is that it fails to adequately protect
the welfare of the child. Once a child is born, custody decisions should be based
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surrogate parenting agreements must be restructured to give the
biological mother a period of time to change her mind after the
birth of the child. This would be consistent with adoption statuteszo7
and is essential if the surrogate's interests are to be sufficiently
protected. Moreover, she should be advised following the birth of
the child of her right to void the contract. Without a personal
counselling session, the surrogate may comply with the provisions
of the surrogate parenting agreement simply because she is unaware
of her right to do otherwise. In circumstances where the surrogate
parenting agreement is incompatible with adoption statutes solely
because it fails to comply with adoption consent requirements, the
surrogate parenting agreement should be voidable. This situation is
analogous to a situation in which one party to a contract lacks
capacity.208In such cases, the contract is generally voidable at the
option of the party lacking capacity.209 The surrogate parenting
agreement should also be voidable where the surrogate's consent is
vitiated.210

on his or her welfare. T h e best interest standard is designed to do this and should
be used even if this would genelally favor the natural father because this is the
standard which is most likely to protect the child. As the court in In re Adoption
of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 974, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Surr. Ct.
1986) explained when confronted with the existence of a child born pursuant to a
surrogate parenting agreement:
T h e reality is that the child is in being and of necessity must be reared
by parents. T h e court . . . has found . . . that it would be in the best
interests of the child to approve the adoption [by the biological father
and his wife]. No other alternative, such as denying the adoption for
the purpose of discouraging such procedures, is appropriate here. This
child needs a home . . . .
See also Baby M, in which the trial court also applied the best interest standard
in determining that the biological father and his wife should be given custody of
Baby M . 217 N.J. Super. 313, 390-98, 525 A.2d 1128, 1166-71 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987). T h e custody determination was affirmed on appeal. 109 N.J. at 45263, 537 A.2d at 1255-61.
In Michigan, the Surrogate Parenting Act provides that while surrogate parenting agreements are unenforceable, "[ilf a child is born . . . pursuant to a
surrogate parentage contract . . . [tlhe . . .court shall award legal custody of the
child based on a determination of the best interests of the child." Surrogate
Parenting Act, supra note 192, at § 11.
207. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 20.
209. See supra note 20.
210. In other words, all surrogate parenting agreements should be voidable -
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If, however, a surrogate parenting agreement also violates babyselling prohibitions, it should be considered void. An impermissible
fee not only vitiates consent, but threatens to create a black market
in b a b y - ~ e l l i n g .Such
~ ~ ~ an agreement should not be enforced at
Finally, the state must determine the fitness of the adopting
couple just as it would investigate the fitness of any other adopting
parents. The investigation should be made prior to the insemination
of the surrogate. Once the investigation has been made and the
adopting couple has been found fit, the surrogate parenting process
can proceed within the limitations set forth above.

B.

Surrogacy and Society at Large

Although surrogate parenting agreements may be enforceable if
they meet the foregoing limitations, they are not desirable. While
surrogate parenting is an attempt to create a new form of independent
adoption, it has much less to recommend it than traditional adoptions,
whether independent or agency. Under current adoption statutes the
state's interest is to protect the welfare of a child whose parents are
unable or unwilling to provide for him or her.213Thus, the state,
by allowing the adoption, helps to meet the child's needs by providing
a mechanism by which the child may be placed with an adoptive
family. The key, though, is that adoption statutes came into being
to address a need - the need to care for existing children without
homes.214The state interest in meeting the needs of these children

either by express provision, allowing the biological mother to change her mind
after the child's birth, o r as a matter of law. Admittedly, this approach is paternalistic. Nonetheless, because a n agreement to surrender a child is different in
kind and not just in degree from other agreements, this added protection of the
biological mother is justified.
21 1. O n the other hand, it may be argued that the refusal to enforce surrogate
parenting agreements will simply reduce further the number of healthy white
babies - which, in turn, will strengthen the black market in baby-selling.
212. Cf. S. 620, 1988 Sess. § 1, 1988 Kan. (Proposed bill would render
surrogate parenting agreements for consideration void, while rendering surrogate
parenting agreements without consideration voidable.).
213. Note, Matching For Adoption: A Study of Current Trends, 22 C A T H .LAW.
70 (1976) ("Theoretically, the primary purpose of adoption procedures is to serve
the best interests of the child.").
214. Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.W. 183, 190, 307 P.2d 175, 180 (1957) ("[Tlhe
purpose of s t a t u t e s for a d o p t i o n is to make provision f o r t h e welfare of
children . . . .").
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resulted in the adoption statutes currently in force in every state.215
Surrogate parenting exists, however, not to meet the needs of
children, but to meet the desires of the adopting couple. Therefore,
at the outset there is lacking in the practice of surrogate parenting
the state interest present in traditional adoptions of meeting the
Moreover, there are thousands of exneeds of existing
isting children in this country who desperately need homes.217The
need for homes for foster children is well documented.218There are
also many children available for adoption.219Of course, many foster
children are not infants and may have a variety of physical and/or
mental health problems.220Moreover, they are disproportionately

215. TASKFORCEREPORT,supra note 3, at 35 ("Adoption statutes were
designed to benefit children in need of parents."); Derdeyn & Wadlington, Adoption:
The Rights of Parents Versus the Best Interests of Their Children, 16 J . AM. ACAD.CHILD
PSYCHIATRY
1 (1977); Huard, The L a w of Adoption, Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND.L .
REV. 743, 748-49 (1956).
216. See Means, supra note 1 , at 466-67 ("Adoption is the societal method
of providing for the necessity of the child. A surrogacy agreement is an agreement
by adults, of adults, and for adults, which they designed to satisfy their own needs
and (some would add) greeds. No necessity of any child prompts such an
agreement. ").
217. There are thousands of children in foster homes, many of whom are
available for adoption. There are also minority, handicapped, and foreign children
available for adoption. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. See also Mushlin,
Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and
Neglect, 23 HARV.C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 199, 201 (1988).
There may also be other children who are adversely affected by surrogate
parenting agreements - other children of the surrogate. In Baby M , for example,
Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate, already had two children when she agreed
to become a surrogate. These children were undoubtedly affected by the surrogate
arrangement. Mary Beth Whitehead actually fled to another state with Baby M
after the birth in a desperate attempt to avoid being separated from her child. 109
N.J. at 415-16, 537 A.2d at 1237. Even in surrogate parenting situations which
proceed without incident, the children of the surrogate will presumably be affected
by the fact that their mother is pregnant for nine months, delivers a baby, but
fails to bring the child home.
218. Mushlin, supra note 217; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at B1, col. 2
("In New York City's glutted foster care system . . . there are not enough families
to go around.").
219. There are "thousands of black and bi-racial children who wait for
permanent homes." ADOPTION
FACTBOOK,
supra note 63, at 32.
220. There were 274,000 "special needs" children in foster care in 1982.
Although many of them were free for adoption, only 9,591 adoptions by foster

Heinonline - - 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.

57 1988-1989

58

COLUMBZAHUMANRZGHTSLAWREVZEW

[Vol. 20:l

racial or ethnic r n i n o r i t i e ~ . ~Like
~ ' any other group, the group of
foster children is composed of individuals, each with his or her own
personality. If more couples opened their homes to these children it
would serve a number of purposes. First, the child who wants and
needs a home would have one. Second, the couple that wants to
care for a child would have one. Third, a child who is well cared
for would be more likely to grow up happy and healthy and become
a productive member of society than one who is homeless, neglected,
or abused. I n addition, for the couple willing to take in a child of
a different race or religion, there is an opportunity for both the
parents and child to become more sensitive to their cultural differences while appreciating their similarities.222Such adoptions might
help to achieve Dr. Martin Luther King's dream that individuals
"not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their
If some of the couples who so desperately want children
would consider opening their hearts and homes to children already
born, society would benefit. While the existence of children available
for adoption does not render surrogate parenting agreements unenforceable, it does illustrate that surrogate parenting may do more
harm than good for society at large.
parents occurred during that year. I d . at 11. "Special needs" children include
those "who may be difficult to place due to ethnic background, age, membership
in a minority o r sibling group, or the presence of physical, emotional or mental
handicaps." I d . at 41.
221. A study conducted by the National Committee for Adoption, based on
1982 data, noted that "[bllack children constitute 14 percent of the child population,
34 percent of foster care, and 41 percent of children free for adoption." I d . at
11. See also i d . at 35 (citing 1984 D H H S report finding similar results). "Regrettably,
there is a consistently poor record in finding adoptive homes for these black
children." I d . at 32.
222. Transracial adoptions are controversial. In fact, the National Association
of Black Social Workers has taken the position that they should not be permitted
at all because it will amount to "cultural genocide." I d . at 32. T h e focus, however,
should be on the best interest of the child. While it may be preferable to place a
child with a family of the same racial or ethnic background, the child will undoubtedly be better off living with a loving family, regardless of racial or ethnic
background, than living in an impersonal state-run institution. Of course, the state
agencies which arrange adoptions must also ensure that their procedures are fair
and d o not make adoption more difficult for minorities than for whites. See generally
id. at 32-34.
223. M . L. King, J r . , March on Washington Speech (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted
in L . DAVIS,I HAVEA DREAM. . . THELIFE A N D TIMES
OF MARTIN
LUTHERKING,
JR. 263 (1969).
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Surrogacy for pay is incompatible with baby-selling prohibitions
and must be prohibited. Surrogate parenting agreements could be
made, however, where no fee would be paid to the surrogate over
and above the fees currently allowed under the adoption laws. In
addition, some mechanism must be established for investigating the
adopting couple's fitness as parents. Finally, surrogate parenting
agreements would have to give the biological mother a period of
time after the child is born to decide whether she wants to surrender
the child. Otherwise, the surrogate parenting agreement would be
voidable at her option. If she decides not to surrender the child, a
custody decision must be made based on the best interest of the
child without regard to the surrogate agreement. Despite the fact
that surrogate parenting agreements can be made to conform to
adoption statutes, society would be better served if infertile couples
would provide a home for some of the thousands of children currently
awaiting adoption.
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